1. As to Defendant B’s ground of appeal on mistake of facts, the recognition of facts should be proved to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt (Article 307(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act). However, the selection of evidence and probative value of evidence based on the premise of fact-finding belong to the free judgment of the fact

(Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act). For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that among the instant facts charged, the facts charged against the said Defendant was recognized, and rejected the allegation in the grounds of appeal as to mistake of facts.

The allegation in the grounds of appeal is merely an error in the judgment of the court below as to the choice of evidence and probative value, which belong to the free judgment of the court of fact-finding.

In addition, even if examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not exhaust all necessary deliberations and did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules

2. Examining the grounds of appeal on the Defendants’ grounds of unfair sentencing in light of the lower judgment’s reasoning that the lower court erred by exceeding the inherent limit of sentencing determination based on the principle of balanced criminal punishment and the principle of responsibility, the above assertion constitutes the assertion of unfair sentencing.

However, under Article 383 subparagraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, an appeal on the grounds of unfair sentencing is allowed only for cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for not less than ten years has been imposed. Thus, in this case where a more minor sentence has been imposed on the Defendants, the above assertion and the argument that the punishment is too unreasonable is not legitimate grounds for

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.