A. In relation to each of the facts charged in the instant case, the Defendant did not deceiving the victims in the same manner as indicated in the facts charged, and had the intent or ability to repay the borrowed money.

B. Legal doctrine misunderstanding (the exercise of the above investigation document) did not recognize that the Defendant submitted a letter of understanding on export of arms (hereinafter “instant document”) as indicated in the lower judgment in the process of submitting relevant documents to the prosecutor’s office as evidentiary materials, and it does not constitute the use of the above investigation document since only the Defendant submitted forged documents to the investigative agency could undermine the public trust in connection with the instant document, since it does not constitute a case where the Defendant used the above investigation document.

(c)

The punishment sentenced by the court below (three years of imprisonment) is too unreasonable.

2. The lower court found the Defendant not guilty of the charge of fraud and the uttering of the above investigation document among each of the facts charged against the Defendant. The lower court found the Defendant guilty of imprisonment with labor for three years and perjury.

The defendant appealed against the guilty portion of the judgment below, and the prosecutor did not appeal against the acquittal portion.

The judgment below

The non-guilty portion was determined separately by the defendant and the prosecutor without appeal, and excluded from the scope of deliberation per party.

3. Determination

A. 1) As to the assertion of mistake of facts, the Defendant asserted the same purport as the above argument in the lower court, and the lower court rejected the above assertion by explaining the grounds for determination.

2) In a case where the appellate court intends to re-examine the first instance judgment and make a subsequent determination ex post, even though there is no objective reason to affect the formation of a documentary evidence in the course of the trial, it would be remarkably unfair to maintain that the first instance judgment was clearly erroneous, or the arguments leading to the acknowledgement of facts are contrary to logical and empirical rules, etc.