2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. The Plaintiff, a school foundation operating an OO high school and an O middle school, owned 12,694m2 in OO-type OO-type OO-type forest (hereinafter “the instant forest”) and O-type O-type 1295-1m2 in O-type 8,549m2 in O-type and 6,255m2 in O-type 6,255m2 in O-type.

B. On March 10, 1999, the Defendant imposed corporate tax of KRW 1,361,188,670 on the Plaintiff, but did not pay it. On October 15, 2004, the Defendant seized the forest land of this case (hereinafter “instant disposition”) and seized each of the above OO Ri’s land (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

C. On the other hand, on August 18, 2010, 1295-2 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 under the name of the Republic of Korea on the ground of expropriation on the 7th of the same month.

D. The Plaintiff filed an appeal on January 25, 2013, but the Tax Tribunal rendered a decision to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the period for filing the appeal expires on March 28, 2013.

Facts without any dispute, Gap's 3, 7, 18, Eul's 1, 2, and 3 (including each number), the purport of the whole pleadings.

2. Determination on this safety defense

The defendant asserts that the lawsuit of this case is unlawful since the plaintiff received each of the dispositions of this case from March 1999 and around October 2004, and the plaintiff filed a request with the Tax Tribunal on January 15, 2013, which was later than 10 months after 13 and August 15, 2013.

However, since each disposition of this case is related to the basic property for education and thus, it is sought to confirm it on the premise that it is void. Thus, in a lawsuit seeking confirmation of invalidity of administrative disposition, it is not necessary to go through a prior trial procedure and there is no limit on the filing period of the lawsuit. Therefore, the defendant

3. Whether each of the dispositions of this case is legitimate

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) The Plaintiff was scheduled to use the instant land as a site for cultivating stuffs for practical training in the same school cooking division while leaving the land as an OOO high school site was used as a site for cultivating gates. The Plaintiff obtained permission from the superintendent of education of Gyeongbuk-do to change the purpose of use of the instant land and did not dispose of the instant land for the above period. Thus, the Plaintiff maintained the nature of fundamental property for educational purposes. On May 30, 201, the superintendent of education of Gyeongbuk-do responded to the Defendant on the ground that the instant land was the basic property for educational purposes, and the Ministry of Finance and Economy and the National Tax Tribunal of the Ministry of Finance and Economy responded to the Defendant on April 14, 197 on the ground that the instant land was the basic property for educational purposes. In light of the above, the instant land constitutes a serious and obvious disposition of Article 28(2) of the Private School Act, Article 12(1)1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Private School Act or a research facility prohibited under Article 4(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act.

2) In order for the Defendant to seize the instant forest, which is an fundamental property for education, the instant land and the instant forest, which is an fundamental property for profit, each of the instant dispositions taken by the Defendant without obtaining permission from the competent authorities under Article 28(1) of the Private School Act, is null and void because its defects are significant and apparent.

(b) Related statutes;

It is as shown in the attached Table related statutes.

(c) Fact of recognition;

1) On May 19, 1967, the Plaintiff completed the registration of ownership transfer on April 28, 1983 with respect to the forest of this case on the grounds of sale on the 8th of the same month, on the grounds of sale on April 28, 1983, under his own name, and thereafter managed the forest of this case and land as basic property for profit-making purposes.

2) On November 25, 1983, the Plaintiff filed an application with the superintendent of education for changing the purpose of use of the instant land as an fundamental property for education, on the ground that he/she uses the instant land as a practice site in a middle and high school. On December 3, 1983, the Plaintiff obtained permission from the superintendent of education for changing the purpose of use.

3) On April 4, 1990, the Plaintiff filed an application with the superintendent of education for the change of the purpose of use of the instant land as a fundamental property for profit on the ground that he/she applied for the change of the purpose of use of the instant land as an underlying property for profit on the ground that he/she would be required to dismantle the Y-gu department and transfer the school site. Accordingly, on May 7, 1990, the superintendent of education permitted the change of use of the instant land as an underlying property for profit on the instant land by adding to certain conditions (as of August 20, 1990, disposing of more than 66,796,80 won).

4) On August 17, 1990, the Plaintiff applied to the superintendent of education for extension of the disposal period to the end of December 31, 1990. However, on the ground that the extension of the disposal period to the Plaintiff was impossible due to the terms of the existing conditions of permission and appraisal, etc. around September 1990, the superintendent of education notified the Plaintiff of the extension of the disposal period by preparing related documents.

5) The Plaintiff did not dispose of the instant land within the above disposal period and did not obtain permission from the superintendent of the Office of Education for the alteration of the purpose of the instant land to the fundamental property for education.

6) However, on July 27, 1998, the Plaintiff submitted to the Superintendent of the Office of Education the pertinent land as a fundamental property for educational purposes when submitting data following the computerization of basic property for educational foundations. On April 14, 2011, the Plaintiff stated the instant land as an fundamental property for educational purposes and reported the current status of the Plaintiff’s fundamental property. In addition, the Plaintiff entered the instant land as an fundamental property for educational administration information system (NEI).

7) On December 4, 2013, the superintendent of education confirmed that the instant land was deemed fundamental property for education while the instant lawsuit was pending, and notified the Plaintiff of the management of the instant land as fundamental property for profit, on the ground that it was not permitted to change the purpose of use as fundamental property for education, on the ground that it was not an fundamental property for profit.

8) Meanwhile, from 2004 to 2008, OO cultivated the instant land and received subsidies for rice income direct payments from 2009 to 2010 respectively. The racing market imposed property tax on the Plaintiff from 1998 to 2012 on the instant land, and the Plaintiff did not object thereto or raise an objection thereto.

9) In the OOO high school, as the instant land used as a camping site was left alone without any specific profits, the construction plan was also proposed. The instant land is currently maintained in the form of farmland.

Facts without any dispute, Gap's evidence Nos. 5, 6, 9, 11 through 14, 16, and Eul's evidence Nos. 5 through 11 (including each number), the result of the fact inquiry into the Superintendent of the Office of Education in this court, and the purport of the whole pleadings.

D. Determination

1) Determination on the first argument

A) Article 28 (2) of the Private School Act provides that "any property prescribed by Presidential Decree among the property of a school juristic person directly used for school education shall not be sold or offered as a security," and the main sentence of Article 12 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Private School Act provides that "property which cannot be sold or offered as a security to a school juristic person pursuant to Article 28 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act shall be property directly used for the education of a private school established and operated by the school juristic person concerned, which corresponds to the land area (title 1), teachers (title 2), gymnasiums (title 3), training or research facilities (title 4), and other facilities, equipment, teaching materials and aids (title 5) directly used for the education."

The prohibition of sale of such property (basic property for education) is not limited to the fact that it cannot be the object of a sales contract, but entirely excludes the possibility of transfer of ownership due to sale and purchase, and thus, the sale by the procedure for disposition on default under the National Tax Collection Act is prohibited, and attachment under the National Tax Collection Act is not allowed (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 96Nu4947, Nov. 15, 199

B) Therefore, on May 7, 190, the Superintendent of the Office of Education of Gyeongbuk-do, as to whether the instant land constitutes an endowment of a school juristic person directly used for school education, was granted subsidies for rice income from the basic property for educational purposes to the basic property for educational purposes on May 7, 1990. Accordingly, there is no room for allowing the Plaintiff to change the use of the instant land as the basic property for educational purposes. However, the Plaintiff stated the school juristic person’s property register, etc. as the basic property for educational purposes and reported the status of the fundamental property to the Superintendent of the Office of Education of Gyeongbuk-do. On December 4, 2013, the Superintendent of the Office of Education confirmed this fact and notified the Plaintiff of the management of the instant land as the basic property for educational purposes on December 4, 2013. The Plaintiff received subsidies for rice income from 2004 to 2010 in sequence, and the Plaintiff’s assertion that the instant land constitutes the basic property for educational purposes cannot be seen as being subject to the Plaintiff’s basic property for educational purposes.

2) Judgment on the second argument

According to Article 28(1) and (2) of the Private School Act and Article 12(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, with respect to fundamental property excluding school sites and teachers, etc. which a school foundation is unable to sell or offer as security, a school foundation shall obtain permission from the competent authorities in cases where it intends to sell, donate, lease, exchange, change the purpose of use, or offer as security, or to waive the obligation or to waive the right, barring special circumstances such as where it is not possible to obtain permission from the competent authorities, seizure of such fundamental property shall be allowed (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Du3669, May 16, 2003).

As seen earlier, the fact that the instant land is the basic property for profit-making purposes is not disputed between the parties, and there is no assertion or proof as to the fact that the instant land is the basic property for profit-making purposes, and that there is no other assertion or proof as to the circumstances under which it is impossible to obtain permission from the competent authorities with respect to the disposition, etc. of the instant land and forest, the seizure of the instant land and forest shall be allowed. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the instant land is not an fundamental property for education or a seizure of the basic property for profit

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.