A. The Defendant, as stated in the facts charged, did not insult the victim, and even if so, there was such fact.

Even if this constitutes a legitimate defense to oppose the illegal arrest of the victim in the act of committing an offense, the lower court erred by misapprehending the facts or by misapprehending the legal doctrine, thereby finding the Defendant guilty of all the charges of this case.

B. The sentence of the lower court’s improper sentencing (one million won in penalty) is too unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. The Defendant alleged the same purport in the lower court’s determination as to the assertion of mistake of facts, and the lower court rejected the above assertion in detail by stating in the column of “determination of the Defendant and his defense counsel’s assertion.” In light of the records, the lower court’s determination is just and acceptable, and there is an error of misunderstanding of facts, as otherwise alleged by the Defendant.

Therefore, the defendant's mistake of facts is without merit.

B. Determination 1 on the unfair argument of sentencing is based on statutory penalty, and the discretionary determination is made within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on the statutory penalty. In our criminal litigation law that takes the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness, there is a unique area for determination of sentencing under Article 1.

In addition, in light of these circumstances and the ex post facto in-depth nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the first instance judgment in the event that there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance judgment, and the first instance judgment does not deviate from the reasonable scope of the discretion. Although the sentence of sentencing falls within the reasonable scope of the discretion, the first instance judgment is reversed solely on the ground that it is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court, and the first instance judgment is to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from the first instance judgment.