2. In a case where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the judgment of the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it.

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). Based on the foregoing legal doctrine, there is no particular change in the sentencing conditions compared with the original judgment on the grounds that new sentencing materials have not been submitted in the health department and the trial on the grounds of the foregoing legal doctrine, and the reason for sentencing alleged by the prosecutor appears to be the circumstances that the lower court has already considered in determining the punishment.

In addition, in full view of all the factors of sentencing, including the Defendant’s age, character and conduct, environment, criminal records, the background and motive leading to the instant crime, and the situation before and after the instant crime, etc., the sentencing of the lower court is too unfasible and it cannot be said that the Defendant exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion, and thus, exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion, in light of the following: (a) the Defendant committed each of the instant crimes in a considerable mental unstable state even though it did not reach the state of mental disorder; and (b) the Defendant committed each of the instant crimes in a state of mental apprehension.

Therefore, prosecutor's assertion is without merit.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.