주위토지통행권확인 등
1. The Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) indicated the attached Form No. 42, 41, 12, among the land size of 520 square meters in Cheongju-si equivalent to Cheongju-si.
A principal lawsuit and a counterclaim shall be deemed simultaneously.
1. Basic facts
A. The Plaintiff is the owner of the Dong-gu E, considerable area of 606 square meters (hereinafter “instant land”). From 1961 to 1961, the Plaintiff is residing in the housing on the ground of the instant land.
B. The Defendant is the owner of 520 square meters wide-gu Seoul metropolitan area in Cheongju-si (hereinafter “the second land in this case”) and D large 57 square meters (hereinafter “the third land in this case”).
C. The land No. 1 of this case has access to the land No. 2 and 3 of this case, and the Plaintiff had resided in the land No. 1 of this case and passed part of the land No. 2 and 3 of this case.
around 2014, the Defendant installed a hack pipe boo, etc. on the land Nos. 2 and 3 of this case and obstructed the Plaintiff’s passage on the land Nos. 2 and 3 of this case.
[Reasons for Recognition] Unsatisfy, each entry or image of Gap evidence 1 through 5 (including each number if there is a provisional number; hereinafter the same shall apply) and the purport of the whole pleadings as a result of the on-site inspection by this court
2. Determination as to the claim on the principal lawsuit
A. Article 219(1) of the Civil Act recognizes the right to passage over surrounding land. Article 219(1) of the Civil Act provides that in a case where there is no passage between a piece of land and a public road, and there is no way necessary for the use of the surrounding land, the owner of the surrounding land can pass over the surrounding land if he is unable to reach the public road without passing over or passing over the surrounding land, or the cost to reach the public road is excessive. (2) In light of the above legal principles, according to the health stand and the above recognition, in order for the Plaintiff to pass through the public road from the first land to the public road, the land of this case must only pass through the second and third land, and there is no particular right to pass over the land of this case. Therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff is
(b) The right of passage over surrounding land as stipulated in Article 219 of the Civil Code, which is within the scope of the right of passage over surrounding land, is a public relation.