Criminal facts have to be proved to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt (Article 307(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act). However, the selection of evidence and the probative value of evidence conducted on the premise of fact-finding belong to the free judgment of the fact-finding court (Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act). On the grounds stated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s receipt of special activity expenses due to the fraudulent supply of special activity expenses and the violation of the Infant Care Act by the lower court constituted the fraudulent method prescribed in the former Infant Care Act (amended by Act No. 11627, Jan. 23, 2013; hereinafter the same) with respect to the fact-finding interest, and found the Defendant guilty.

The allegation in the grounds of appeal disputing the determination of the lower court is merely an error of the lower court’s determination on the selection and probative value of evidence, which substantially belongs to the free judgment of the fact-finding court. Moreover, even if examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine and the relevant legal doctrine and the duly admitted evidence, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the subject of the duty of disclosure required under the good faith principle, fraud, and “any false or other unlawful means” as provided by Article 54(3)6 of the former Infant Care Act, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.