The part is remanded to Seoul High Court.

(1) On the first ground for appeal

The lower court recognized the following facts by cooking relevant evidence. In other words, the Plaintiff set up a site as a matter of this case, and the Defendant, at his own expense, intended to share this unit as a usual share, because the building of the third floor was set up on this site, and the Defendant intended to share this unit as a usual share. In light of the record, the lower court’s examination of the process of documentary evidence based on the premise that the lower court recognized such facts, there is no illegality in documentary evidence.

원심이 위와같은 사실을 인정하면서 이것과 저촉되는 자료가 될수 있다고 보이는 을제10호증의 1,2(서울고등법원 및 대법원판결)와 을제11호증의 1, 2, 4에 관하여 배척한다는 판시를 하지 않고 있는 것은 사실이다. 그러나 을제10호증의 1, 2의 판결이유중에 판단된 사유가 본건 원피고 사이에서 기속력을 가질수 없음은 기판력의 이론에 비추어 명백하고, 또 원심판결의 전후문맥에 비추어보면 원심은 을제10호증의 1,2및 제11호증의 1,2,4의 각 기재를 취신하지 않으려는 취지임을 엿보지 못할바 아니다. 따라서 원피고 사이의 합의내용이 을제1,2호증에 기재된것처럼 (가) 원피고가 합자하여 집을 지은뒤에 대지와 건물의 1,2층은 원피고의 공유로 하되, 건물의 3층은 피고의 단독소유로 한다. (나) 건물의 공유부분의 운영은 피고가 하고, 원고의 지분에 대한 임료는 그 부근의 임료에 비하여 2할싸게 한다. 라는 취지의 합의이었다는 논지는 별로 그럴듯한 근거도 제시하지 못하면서 공연히 적법하게 다루어진 원심의 사실판단을 비난하는데 불과하다. 욧컨대 논지가 말하는 증거판단의 유탈은 원심판결에 영향을 미칠만한것이 못된다.

(2) On the second ground for appeal:

It is true that the court below, in order to acknowledge the above facts, deemed the whole evidence as favorable to the plaintiff as one of the comprehensive evidence of No. 2-4 (Examination of Suspected Examination against the defendant) which cannot be viewed as favorable to the plaintiff. However, in light of the context before and after the judgment of the court below, only the above documentary evidence is employed as favorable to the plaintiff, and the remaining part cannot be seen as excluding this.

In addition, even though the court below excluded the above evidence Nos. 2-4 from the evidence adopted to acknowledge the above facts, it can be recognized that the whole building of this case is jointly owned by the original defendant.

The judgment of the court below shall not be deemed to have affected the original judgment because the court below erred in the fact-finding or the lack of reasoning based on evidence.

(3) On the third ground for appeal:

On June 4, 1965, the court below submitted the evidence No. 20-1 to 27 of the evidence No. 20 as evidence, in view of the partial entry (Records No. 499, 500, and Chapter No. 502) of the briefs dated May 31, 1965, which the defendant's agent stated at the third pleading No. 14:00, the tax amount on the building of this case from June 1958 to April 30, 1965.

In addition, this tax is stated to the effect that it should be deducted from the amount of damages claimed by the Plaintiff. In addition, in light of the records, on July 22, 1964, the date of first instance trial, the date of first instance trial, the date of first instance trial, and on July 14:0, 1964, part of the preparatory documents (record No. 423), which the Defendant stated by his agent, stated to the effect that it would be offset against the equivalent amount among the Plaintiff’s claims, since the Defendant bears a burden of KRW 52,947 on the land tax for the same day as of July 1961 through May 1963 (see, e.g., Articles 309 and 386 of the records). Accordingly, the lower court should have determined on this point by clarifying the Defendant’s series of attack methods as above, and there is no judgment on this point.

Therefore, this issue is justified.

Next, we examine the grounds of appeal by the defendant's agent for the defendant's reasons for appeal.

(1) On the first ground for appeal

In light of the records, the plaintiff's assertion was summarized in light of the records, first, the plaintiff's assertion was first presented by the original defendant, because the two buildings consisting of two separate buildings across the boundary of the brick wall on the building site, and the original defendant was able to do so. However, according to the circumstances, this plan was modified to the third floor building of Han bonds, and the original defendant's share was jointly owned as equal shares.

If so, it is not contradictory to the plaintiff's argument, and therefore, it is not necessary to exercise the right of explanation to arrange the plaintiff's argument.

(2) On the second ground for appeal:

The defendant did not prove that the amount of damages is offset against the plaintiff's principal claim amount and the equivalent amount, because the plaintiff invadeds on the side of the defendant management for 50 days or more.

In such a case, it cannot be said that the court committed an incomplete hearing due to the failure to demand the proof of the defendant and the failure to exercise the right of explanation.

(3) On the third ground for appeal:

This is the same as the ground of appeal No. 3, which is completed above, and thus, it does not re-conven.

(4) On the fourth ground for appeal:

The lower court recognizes that the descriptions of the evidence Nos. 1 and 2 are written by the Defendant against the Plaintiff’s will in light of the Plaintiff’s testimony as stated in the evidence Nos. 2-2 and the witness Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 2. There is no error of law in the process of fact-finding by the lower court. Other grounds of appeal are the same as the grounds of appeal No. 1 even after completion of the appeal.

(5) On the fifth ground for appeal:

Since the argument that the legal act mentioned in the evidence Nos. 1 and 2 is remarkably unfair is made on the part of the plaintiff, even though the court below omitted its decision on this point, the defendant, who is the appellant, shall not be dissatisfied with it.

In addition, as seen above, the court below has duly judged the facts that the evidence Nos. 1 and 2 was not prepared by the plaintiff's will.

(6) On the sixth ground of appeal:

According to the facts duly established by the court below as seen above, only the original defendant had the 1/2 shares of each unit, and there is no special agreement on the management thereof.

The management of the building is determined by the majority of the shares in accordance with Article 265 of the Civil Code.However, in this case, although the shares do not reach the majority, the defendant used or lent the building to another person by the defendant (out of the limit with the plaintiff) and acquired the negligence, so it can be seen that the defendant's management act infringed the plaintiff's right to share in the building.

The author argues that co-owners should naturally develop the theory of the right to manage the article jointly owned but can not be employed.

Thus, the above act of the defendant cannot be deemed as a preservation act. Although the court below did not clearly state that there was an intention or negligence to the defendant clearly in its decision, it shall not be deemed to be such purport in light of the context of the judgment below. The court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the act of management and preservation, which can be done by a single person of co-owners, or as to the establishment of tort.

(7) On the seventh ground:

The court below held as follows against the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription. In other words, the plaintiff believed that this co-ownership contract between the plaintiff and the defendant will be carried out as a net set, and the defendant's defense is recognized to have been transferred up later than a certain period, and the defendant's complaint against the defendant was filed to the effect that the defendant embezzled rent on this case's house around July 1961. In this case, the defendant's complaint was filed to the effect that the defendant embezzled rent on this case's house, barring any other circumstance, the defendant's defense was known at the time of the filing of the complaint, and since this lawsuit was filed on November 27, 1962.

However, considering the fact that the plaintiff's ground of claim in this case infringed the plaintiff's right to share in the building of this case, the defendant claims damages from May 1, 1958 to April 30, 1964 and damages from May 1, 1964 to the date of closing argument at the fact-finding court. If there are special circumstances, it would be reasonable to view that the defendant had already known that he was the perpetrator of this case's tort at the time when the defendant infringed the plaintiff's right to share.

The court below believed that the defendant was able to properly deal with it according to the sharing contract, but did not seem to have been aware of the perpetrator at this time. However, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the starting point of the statute of limitations for the claim for damages caused by tort.

This paper is reasonable.

Accordingly, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant shall be reversed, and this part shall be remanded to the Seoul High Court.

This decision is consistent with the opinions of the involved judges.

The judge of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) of the Republic of Korea shall have the authority to transfer a red net holiday.