2. Under our criminal litigation law, which takes the principle of court-oriented trials and the principle of direct determination, there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and where the sentencing of the first instance does not go beyond the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it. It is desirable to refrain from destroying the first instance judgment and imposing a sentence that differs from the first instance court solely on the ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion but is somewhat different from the appellate court’s opinion (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). Considering the above legal principles, the first instance court’s determination in light of the fact that the Defendant had already been punished several times for the same kind of crime, and even if the Defendant had had the history of having already been punished several times for the same crime, it is difficult to recover damage with respect to the crime of the second instance court’s judgment, etc., which is unfavorable to the Defendant, or the Defendant’s alteration of the sentencing of the first instance court’s judgment to the extent of reasonable sentencing.

The prosecutor's above assertion is without merit.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the grounds that the appeal is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.