1. The lower court, as indicated in its reasoning, acknowledged that the Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with the Defendant on November 17, 200 for the first year lease period until December 31, 2001 (hereinafter “instant lease agreement”) to lease KRW 2,117,00 for the second year lease period until December 31, 2002 (hereinafter “the instant lease agreement”). The Plaintiff increased the rental deposit with the renewal of the instant lease agreement for two years after the expiration of the above lease period, but did not pay the increased rental deposit, and on this ground, terminated the instant lease agreement on September 19, 200. The instant real estate was a rental house for the tax resident, and the Defendant still excluded from the statutory tax resident on February 5, 2007 to the tax resident, and thus, rejected the Plaintiff’s claim for the increase of the rental deposit in excess of the above lease deposit amount or the Plaintiff’s claim for the increase in the lease deposit in excess of the above limit under the Housing Lease Protection Act. Thus, it is unreasonable or unreasonable.

2. However, we cannot accept the judgment of the court below for the following reasons.

According to the records, the defendant's initial beneficiaries under Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the National Basic Living Security Act (hereinafter referred to as "legal beneficiaries"), as seen above, leased the real estate which is permanently constructed under the Rental Housing Act. Article 1 of the Special Conditions of the Lease Agreement provides that "(i) legal tenant, low-income mother and child households, (ii) the first decline who lost the eligibility falling under paragraph (1) after occupancy, (iii) the second decline who lost the eligibility falling under paragraphs (1) through (3), and (iv) the above special condition that Article 3 of the above Special Conditions provides that "the tenant shall be allowed to renew the lease contract on two-year basis at his request, but the tenant shall be subject to 0-10 of the above Special Conditions of 90, 2000, 300, 400, 400, 400, 200, 160, 400, 196, 205, 201.

On the other hand, as to the Plaintiff’s claim for termination of the contract of this case, the Defendant, through a preparatory document dated February 26, 2009, lost the legal status as a statutory resident on or around February 2007. Thus, at the time of the renewal of the contract of this case, the Defendant asserted that the increase of the deposit of this case, premised on the Defendant’s loss of legal status as a statutory resident at the time of the renewal of the contract of this case, was erroneous. In light of the facts alleged by the Defendant, the issue of whether the Defendant lost the legal status as the statutory resident at the time of the renewal of the contract of this case at the time of the renewal of the contract of this case can be seen as a major issue that can determine the legality

However, according to the evidence submitted by the Defendant as evidence of the above argument No. 4, the Defendant was determined to be eligible for benefits for basic livelihood security on October 1, 2000 and excluded from eligibility for benefits on February 5, 2007. On the other hand, it is difficult to conclude that the entry of the list of basic livelihood security beneficiaries attached to the evidence No. 11, which the Plaintiff used as the ground for raising the deposit security deposit of this case, was excluded from the beneficiary around January 2004. Thus, it is highly likely that the Defendant continued to maintain the legal beneficiary status at the time of the renewal of the above 2 and 3 contracts.

In addition, if the circumstances are the same, the plaintiff should have imposed a rental deposit calculated by applying the statutory tenant qualification to the defendant at the time of the renewal of the above two and three contracts. On the other hand, it is deemed that the defendant's qualification as the tenant falls under the first and second sloping persons prescribed in Article 1 of the above special condition, and that the defendant applied such tenant qualification to increase and impose a rental deposit to the defendant by applying such tenant qualification is subject to the terms and conditions unfavorable to the defendant in violation of Article 3 of the above special condition providing that the lessee should be subject to differential imposition of the rental deposit according to the lessee qualification in the case of renewal of the lease contract. Therefore, in light of the above facts as seen earlier, the increase in the rental deposit in this case seems to exceed the amount calculated when the defendant is subject to statutory tenant qualification at the time of the renewal of the above two and the third contract, barring any special circumstance, the defendant is not obliged to pay it in response to the increase in the rental deposit in this case calculated unlawfully and therefore,

Therefore, with respect to the above assertion made by the Defendant in the preparatory brief dated February 26, 2009, the court below should first clearly examine whether the Defendant lost the legal status of the statutory tenant at the time of the renewal of the above 2 and 3 contracts, and further, if the Defendant did not lose its qualification, it should have examined whether the increase in the deposit amount in this case was legitimate and the impact on the validity of the termination of the contract in this case if it is unlawful, but it should have examined whether the increase in the deposit amount in this case was impact on the validity of the termination of the contract in this case. However, the court below failed to exhaust all necessary deliberation and determination, and rejected the claim of the Plaintiff. Thus, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the increase in the deposit amount in permanent rental housing, which affected the conclusion

3. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Nung-hwan (Presiding Justice)