1. As to ground of appeal No. 1, the Local Tax Act provides that a person who actually owns the property as of the property tax assessment basis date as a taxpayer.

(Article 107(1). Here, the term "person in de facto possession" means the actual owner of the property, regardless of whether registered as the owner in the public record.

(2) Article 36(1) of the Urban Development Act provides that if a land substitution is designated, the owner of the previous land may exercise the same right as the previous one with regard to the land substitution, from the effective date of the designation of the land substitution to the date of the public announcement of the disposition of replotting, and the previous land cannot be used or profitable. Article 36(3) of the same Act provides that if the designation of the land substitution takes effect, the previous owner of the land substitution may not use or profit from the land substitution, and the previous owner of the land may actually dispose of the land substitution after the designation takes effect, and the previous land owner and the designated person (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiff”) constituted the person who actually owns the land substitution as of the tax base date of the property of this case.

Examining the record in light of the aforementioned provisions and legal principles, the lower court did not err in its determination by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the de facto owner’s determination in urban development by replotting, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

2. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 3

A. In the process of appeal regarding taxation, this procedure is applicable.