제3자이의
1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. On July 15, 2015, this Court
1. Basic facts
A. B completed the ownership transfer registration on May 7, 2014 with respect to an automobile listed in the separate sheet (hereinafter “instant automobile”), and the Defendant completed the mortgage creation registration on May 8, 2014 with the amount of credit on the said automobile as KRW 29 million.
B. On January 5, 2015, the Defendant applied for an order to deliver a motor vehicle before filing a request for auction on the instant motor vehicle, and received an order to deliver the motor vehicle on January 6, 2015.
On January 16, 2015, the enforcement officer of this Court executed the above order of delivery on the instant motor vehicle parked in the 6 parking lot of 751-gil, Seo-gu, Daejeon, Seo-gu.
C. On January 28, 2015, the Defendant applied for an automobile rental auction as D in this court, and received a ruling to commence the auction on January 29, 2015.
[Reasons for Recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence 1, Eul evidence 1, the purport of the whole pleadings
2. The assertion and judgment
A. On July 10, 2014, the Plaintiff asserted that: (a) lent money to B as security; and (b) lawfully acquired the right to possess the instant vehicle from B; and (c) thus, (d) the Plaintiff has the right to prevent the delivery of the instant automobile.
Therefore, compulsory execution against the automobile of this case should not be permitted.
(b) Possessory rights of a third party are also included in the right to interfere with the assignment or acceptance of the object of judgment of compulsory execution, but in such a case must be capable of opposing against the executory creditor.
(See Supreme Court Decision 2007Da7409 Decided May 10, 2007, etc.). Even according to the Plaintiff’s assertion, the Plaintiff’s custody of the instant automobile from B was established a pledge against the instant automobile, and such establishment of a pledge is in violation of Articles 2 and 9 of the Act on Mortgage on Specific Movables including Automobiles, which provide that “the specific movable property, such as an automobile, shall not be subject to a pledge,” and is null and void in light of the principle of a real right law, and otherwise, the Plaintiff is the executor of the instant automobile.