2. If there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the judgment of the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it.

Although the sentence of the first instance court falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from that of the first instance court on the sole ground that it is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court.

(Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). We examine the foregoing legal doctrine in light of the foregoing.

There is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the original judgment because new sentencing materials have not been submitted in the trial.

In full view of all of the reasons for sentencing as stated by the lower court, including the fact that the instant crime was committed when the juvenile was committed, it is not recognized that the lower court’s sentencing exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion because it was too unhued.

The prosecutor's assertion of unfair sentencing is without merit.

3. The prosecutor's appeal of conclusion is without merit, and it is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. It is so decided as per Disposition.