[2] The case holding that in a case where a traffic accident occurred while driving a motor vehicle jointly owned by a named insured and a prospective partner and a prospective partner, the case holding that the above motor vehicle is jointly owned by the named insured's father and does not constitute "other motor vehicle" under the terms and conditions, and thus, it does not constitute "other motor vehicle" as stipulated in the registered insured's terms and conditions, since the "other motor vehicle driver's security agreement" which was entered into with the insured as the insured's husband and the insured's husband does not constitute "other motor vehicle" under the registered insured's special terms and conditions

The interpretation of a standardized contract shall be interpreted fairly and reasonably in light of the purpose and purpose of the standardized contract in question in accordance with the principle of trust and good faith, but it shall be objectively and uniformly interpreted on the basis of average customer's understandability without taking into account the intended purpose and intent of the individual contracting parties. Even after such interpretation, in cases where the meaning of the standardized contract is unclear, such as where the standardized contract provisions are objectively and objectively interpreted and their respective interpretations are rational, it shall be interpreted favorably to customers. However, in light of the purpose and purpose of the standardized contract in question in question, if the standardized contract provisions are interpreted fairly, reasonably, and objectively and uniformly on the basis of average customer's understandability, there is no room to limit the standardized contract provisions in favor of customers (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Da5120, Sept. 9,

According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, according to the special terms and conditions of automobile driving security (hereinafter “the special terms and conditions of this case”) among the comprehensive automobile insurance contract that the defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff, hereinafter “the defendant”) entered into with the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant, hereinafter “the plaintiff”) with her husband Kim Jong-do, the plaintiff shall be deemed to be an insured automobile operating another motor vehicle while driving another motor vehicle and shall be compensated in accordance with the ordinary terms and conditions, if the plaintiff suffered damage as a result of legal liability due to a substitute accident or substitute accident caused by another motor vehicle while driving the other motor vehicle. However, “other motor vehicle” in the special terms and conditions of this case refers to “the name of the insured and his parents, spouse, or children are not owned or used normally,” and “the insured” refers to the name of the insured and her spouse, and the defendant is aware of the fact that the victim died while driving a motor vehicle jointly owned by Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 2 who is a pilot (hereinafter “the vehicle of this case”).

Therefore, the instant motor vehicle is obviously owned by the father of the registered insured and not falling under the “other motor vehicle” of the instant special terms and conditions. Therefore, it is deemed that the Plaintiff has no liability to compensate for the said accident based on the instant special terms and conditions.

Nevertheless, the lower court determined otherwise by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the interpretation of the terms and conditions as seen earlier, that the instant automobile constitutes “other automobiles” stipulated in the instant special terms and conditions on the ground that, even if the Plaintiff’s parents are jointly owned by another person, if it is actually used by another person, not the parents, it should be deemed that it does not constitute “other automobiles owned by the parents” under the said special terms and conditions.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee In-bok (Presiding Justice)