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(영문) 청주지방법원 2020.08.20 2019나15978

건물등철거

Text

1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

3. Disposition of the first instance judgment No. 2

Reasons

1. The reasoning of the court’s explanation concerning this case is as follows, and this case is cited by the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, since it is identical to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the following modifications.

2.The third-party 10 to 4-party 2 of the judgment of the first instance that was adopted by this court are as follows.

Through a compulsory auction on real estate on November 12, 2018, 1/3, the Plaintiff, and 1/2, 1/6, out of F’s 1/3 on March 18, 2019, the remainder of 1/2, and 1/6, respectively, are sold to E, and G, as the owner of the instant housing on December 9, 2003, was approved to use the instant housing and completed the registration of ownership preservation on December 17, 2004, and on April 17, 2006, it is recognized that the instant housing was sold to the Defendant and the registration of ownership transfer was completed on May 16, 206.

According to the above facts, in order for the Defendant to claim against the Plaintiff the opposing power under Article 622(1) of the Civil Act, a lease agreement for the purpose of owning the instant house exists between G, E, F, and C at the time of registration of ownership preservation of the instant house, or between the Defendant, E, F, and C at the time of registration of ownership transfer of the instant house, there was a lease agreement for the purpose of owning the instant house.

However, it is difficult to believe that the Defendant leased the instant land from E, F, and C for the purpose of owning the instant land, as stated in subparagraphs 1 and 5-1 through 6, respectively.

Meanwhile, even if G leased the instant land at KRW 10,00 each year with the instant building from 9 South Korea, including Defendant, E, F, and C, even if G leased the instant land, it is apparent that it was not a land lease contract for the purpose of owning the instant building, thereby supporting that G leased the instant land for the purpose of owning the instant housing.