[부동산취득세부과고지처분취소청구사건][고집1967특,200]
Point of reckoning the statute of limitation of real estate acquisition tax
The extinctive prescription of the right to impose the acquisition tax on real estate is initiated from the time when there was a reason to verify the acquisition of real estate by the competent tax office, and only when such reason had occurred prior to the expiration of the reporting period for acquisition by the acquisitor, and if there is no such a reason, it will proceed from the time when the registration for acquisition of ownership was made.
Article 48 of the Local Tax Act
67Nu25 delivered on June 20, 1967
Plaintiff
Head of Seodaemun-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government
The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
Litigation costs shall be borne by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff sought a decision that the disposition of imposing 16,440 won of the real estate acquisition tax on the plaintiff as of November 16, 1966 is revoked.
1. First of all, we examine whether the lawsuit in this case was lawful by the examination procedure as stipulated in Article 58 of the Local Tax Act. According to the purport of the argument as stated in subparagraphs 4-1 and 2, the plaintiff was imposed on November 16, 1966 by the defendant as of November 28, 196 and was requested to re-examine the defendant on November 30, 196, and again the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor through the defendant on December 12, 196, the decision of dismissal was made as of December 27, 196, and this was also recognized.
However, according to Article 58 (1) through (3) of the Local Tax Act and Article 44 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, among local taxes, a person who has an objection to the disposition of imposition of real estate acquisition tax corresponding to the Do tax in Seoul Special Metropolitan City may make a request to the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor, and if the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor is dissatisfied with the decision of the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor, the authority to make a re-inspection shall be granted to the Minister of Home Affairs through the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor, and the authority to review the decision shall be granted to the Minister of Home Affairs. Thus, in this case where the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor entrusts the defendant, who is the head of the Gu within his jurisdiction, with the right to impose the acquisition tax of real estate within the jurisdiction of the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor (this delegation shall be interpreted as Article 4 of the Local Tax Act) and the defendant has the authority to make a re-audit. However, the authority to review this decision shall be the same as when the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor has made a re-audit decision.
However, in such a case, the defendant is the agency delegated by the head of the Seoul Special Metropolitan City, and thus the defendant will be the agency via which the request for examination was filed by the head of the Seoul Special Metropolitan City. Thus, even if the plaintiff erroneously designated the person having authority to review and submitted it to the defendant, it shall be deemed that the request for examination was duly accepted by the Minister of Home Affairs at the time of the defendant's receipt. Thus, in this case where there is no evidence to prove that there was a decision by the Minister of Home Affairs on January 12, 1967 after the elapse of 30 days from the date on which the request for examination was accepted, the plaintiff's request for examination pursuant to Article 58 (5), (2) and (9) of the Local Tax Act shall be deemed to have been dismissed after the lapse of 30 days from the date on which the above request for examination was received. Accordingly, according to the records, this lawsuit shall be deemed to have been filed within the legitimate period from the date on which the request for examination was received.
2. Therefore, we examine the merits.
In summary of the facts of the plaintiff's assertion, the plaintiff purchased from the non-party 2 on August 5, 1959, the non-party 1 for a period of 20 days after the lapse of 5 years from August 26, 1959, the period of reporting the acquisition of the real estate of this case, which was 20 days after the expiration of 20 days from August 26, 1959, from the non-party 2 to the non-party 1 for the non-party 16: the non-party 1 for the same location (number 2 omitted), 1 for the non-party 1 for the non-party 1 for the non-party 1 for the non-party 2 for the non-party 1 for the non-party 1 for the non-party 1 for the non-party 2's purchase of the real estate of this case, or for the non-party 2 for the plaintiff's ownership transfer registration or the change of the land cadastre.
In light of the above, the extinctive prescription of the right to impose the real estate acquisition tax is proceeded from the time when there was a reason to verify the acquisition of real estate by the tax authorities. On the other hand, only when such reason occurred prior to the expiration of the reporting period for acquisition of real estate, and in the absence of such a reason, the registration for acquisition of real estate will proceed from the time when the registration for acquisition was made. In this case, there is no evidence to prove that the defendant could have confirmed the acquisition of the real estate in this case before the expiration of the reporting period for acquisition of the real estate in this case (the above statement that the plaintiff did not change the registration for acquisition as well as the registration for transfer of the ownership or the registration for transfer of the house register and the name of the land cadastre). Thus, the plaintiff's assertion that the extinctive prescription of the right to impose the tax on the real estate in this case will run naturally with the lapse of the reporting period for acquisition of real estate in this case is erroneous, and there is no other evidence to prove that
Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed and the costs of lawsuit are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition.
Judges Kim Young-ju (Presiding Justice) Lee Chang-joon