Among the defendants B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K, and L, this part of the case is reversed.

1. Plaintiff’s ground of appeal

A. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below dismissed the Plaintiff’s respective claims against Defendant B and 8, on the ground that “A”’s deposit withdrawal against the Defendants cannot be deemed as being socially reasonable or inevitable acts, on the ground that the payment of deposits to the Defendants by Defendant B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K, and L (hereinafter “Defendant B and eight others”) constitutes a biased act that undermines equal distribution among bankruptcy creditors by paying deposits only to the Defendants, who are specific deposit holders, in a critical situation in which business suspension is anticipated. It is reasonable to view that A had the awareness that repayment is made to a specific creditor in order to avoid the principle of creditor equality applied when bankruptcy proceedings commence at the time of the payment of deposits.”

B. However, it is difficult to accept the above determination by the court below for the following reasons.

(1) The so-called "act of knowing that the debtor causes damage to the bankruptcy creditor," which is an act subject to avoidance under Article 391 subparagraph 1 of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act (hereinafter "the Debtor Rehabilitation Act"), includes not only so-called "act of absolute reduction of the debtor's general property, which is a joint security of all creditors, but also so-called "act of biased distribution, which is contrary to the fairness of other bankruptcy creditors, by affecting the debtor's property relations, such act as repayment or provision of security to a specific creditor.

However, in order to be recognized as the above intentional person, the debtor should have known the damage to the bankruptcy creditor as a subjective requirement.