A. The Plaintiff is a company that produces and sells C. The Defendant is a company that produces and sells C. The Defendant’s Act on the Management of Public Institutions (hereinafter “Public Institutions Operation Act”).

(2) The Defendant purchases C at the end of the immediately preceding year or at the beginning of the corresponding year by holding a bid at the end of each year for the installation of pipes network necessary for the supply of standardized natural gas.

B. The Plaintiff’s bid collusion and Fair Trade Commission’s resolution 1) omit all the descriptions of the Plaintiff, E, F, G, H, and I (hereinafter “stock company”) in stating the name of the company.

() From January 2003 to December 2, 2013, the Defendant agreed in advance on the scheduled bid price, the bid price, the bid price, the failure to enter into a bid, the distribution of the quantity, etc. (hereinafter “instant bid collusion”) to avoid price competition in the total of 37 biddings listed in attached Table 1, which the Defendant ordered from January 2003 to December 2, 2013.

(2) On December 21, 2017, the Fair Trade Commission determined that six companies, including the Plaintiff, violated Article 19(1)3 and 8 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereinafter “Fair Trade Act”) through the instant bidding collusion, and decided to take corrective measures and impose penalty surcharges (Plaintiff 21,44,000,000) on six companies, including the Plaintiff.

C. On March 6, 2018, the Defendant’s disposition 1, based on the above resolution of the Fair Trade Commission, held a contract deliberation committee on March 6, 2018, and the contract deliberation committee divided the opinion that “the successful bidder shall be deemed to have received all the successful bidders since the bid collusion in this case was conducted for a long time,” and then falls under “the person who received the successful bidder by leading the collusion.”