임대차보증금
1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.
1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court of first instance is as stated in the part of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the dismissal of part of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance as follows 2. Thus, it is acceptable to accept it as it is in accordance with the main sentence of
2. Ten pages 2, 10 of the judgment of the court of first instance, in which the part of construction was used, "the real estate of this case" shall be cut into "the real estate of this case".
In the second sentence of the first instance judgment, the plaintiff was present at the time of concluding the contract for sale in lots with the defendant D. "(D. The plaintiff was present at the time of entering into the contract for sale in lots with the defendant D. The plaintiff was also present at the time of entering into the contract for sale in lots (as seen below, the plaintiff was also present at the time of entering into the contract for sale in lots with the defendant D.). As to the fact that the plaintiff was aware of the error of the moving-in report on January 6, 2015, which was the date of entering into the contract for sale in lots, and whether the tenant was aware of the sale and purchase of the house and the existence of the transferee, notwithstanding the important part, whether the plaintiff was present at the time of entering into the contract for sale in lots with the defendant, it is reasonable to view that the plaintiff was present at the time of entering into the contract for sale in lots with D, considering that the plaintiff
The 3rd part of the first instance judgment, 17th day (17th day) or less, shall be followed as follows:
A person shall be appointed.
3. The effect of the move-in report on the instant real estate is not recognized as a move-in report made by erroneously stating the subject and number of houses, and the effect of the move-in report occurs only on January 7, 2015, the following day after the corrective report is filed. Therefore, it cannot be deemed that D naturally succeeded to the lessor status pursuant to Article 3(4) of the Housing Lease Protection Act.
However, although D did not explicitly consent to take over the obligation to return the lease deposit as lessor.
Even if the plaintiff was present in the sales contract between the defendant and D, the plaintiff was D.