[2] In a case where: (a) the Defendant immediately stops a vehicle in front of the vehicle A, which was driven by a two-lanes on an expressway, immediately stops; and (b) the vehicle A and the two vehicles following it stopped; (c) but thereafter, the vehicle B, which was behind the stop, caused the death of the vehicle B by stopping the front vehicle on a chain basis; and (d) inflicted an injury on the victims, such as the other vehicle driver, etc., the case affirming the judgment below which found the Defendant to have committed a crime of general traffic obstruction

[2] The case affirming the judgment below which acknowledged the crime of interference with general traffic on the ground that, in case where the defendant, while driving a motor vehicle along the two-lanes on an expressway, immediately stops in front of the motor vehicle A, immediately after rapid stop, and the two vehicles behind the motor vehicle A and the two vehicles behind it, but the motor vehicle of Eul, which followed the motor vehicle following it, was parked just because there was a proximate causal relation between the defendant's act of stopping the motor vehicle and the two vehicles behind it, and caused the death of Eul and injury to the victims, such as the other motor vehicle driver, etc., by driving the motor vehicle on an expressway of the two-lanes on the road, in light of the traffic situation at the site or the ordinary driver's behavior, etc., the defendant who stopped at the one-lanes on the expressway of the two-lanes on the road, could not fully fulfill his duty of care such as complying with the speed limit or securing safety distance, there was a possibility of the possibility of thought and injury.

1. The crime of death and injury caused by traffic obstruction under Article 188 of the Criminal Act is an aggravated crime. Thus, in order to establish the above crime, there should be proximate causal relation between traffic obstruction and the result of thought, and it should be possible to anticipate the occurrence of the result at the time of the act. In addition, not only where traffic obstruction act causes the result of the victim's thought, but also where there is another fact such as negligence of the victim or a third party, etc. between the act and the result thereof, if it is ordinarily foreseeable that such fact can be ordinarily predicted (see Supreme Court Decision 93Do3612 delivered on March 22, 1994).

2. The first instance court found the Defendant guilty of having violated the duty of care of the victim by failing to stop or stop a vehicle with five tons driven by the victim non-indicted 2, who failed to comply with the duty of care of the victim, on the ground that it was difficult for the victim non-indicted 1, who proceeded with the first two lanes, and immediately stopped at approximately six seconds after the victim non-indicted 1's vehicle was immediately parked, and the vehicle and the vehicle were parked in the second and second lanes at normal speed, but it was difficult for the victim to have been negligent in interfering with the victim's death by failing to stop or stopping the vehicle, on the other hand, on the ground that it was difficult for the victim non-indicted 2 to have failed to meet the duty of care of the victim, even if the victim non-indicted 2, who was driven by the victim non-indicted 2, who failed to stop the vehicle and thus caused the collision between the victim and the driver of the vehicle after stopping the vehicle.

The lower court upheld the first instance judgment on the ground that there was no error by misapprehending the legal principles on proximate causal relation or predictability in the judgment of the first instance court.

3. Examining the evidence duly adopted and examined by the lower court and the first instance court in light of the legal doctrine as seen earlier, the recognition and determination of the first instance court maintained by the lower court is justifiable.

The allegation in the grounds of appeal is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to causation, incomplete deliberation, and predictability. The summary of the ideology of the victims in this case was caused by Non-Indicted 2's failure to perform his duty of care for safe driving, such as speeding at front time, securing safety distance, and speeding at the time of occurrence of an emergency, and thus there is no proximate causal relation with the Defendant's stopping act. The Defendant, who temporarily stopped the vehicle at the time, and confirmed that the vehicle was completely stopped, and thought that the occurrence of the occurrence of the injury to the victims was not predicted.

However, according to the facts and evidence duly admitted by the lower court and the first instance court, the Defendant continued to stop at a normal speed of 110 to 120 kilometers, even though at the time, and immediately stopped at about 6 seconds after leaving the first-lane victim Nonindicted Party 1 in front of a speed of 110 to 120 kilometers depending on two lanes, and immediately stopped at around 6 seconds. While the victim Nonindicted Party 1’s vehicle and the second-class vehicle following it were parked at a rapid speed, it is difficult to find that the vehicle driven by the victim Nonindicted Party 2 was under the duty of care of the Defendant, even if it was difficult to find out that there was a special reason to believe that there was no possibility that there was a safe causal relation between the victim’s vehicle and the second-lane driver’s act of driving on the expressway and the second-lane driver’s act of driving on the expressway, and thus, it is difficult to find out that there was no other reason to believe that there was a specific reason to believe that there was a safe distance between the Defendant and the driver’s act of driving on the expressway.

In addition, the argument in the grounds of appeal that there was no possibility of predictability is difficult to accept when based on the defendant's prosecutor's statement, etc. that stated that "not how to cause an accident" in the course of establishing a vehicle, and such predictability should be objectively determined on the basis of the general public. It is easy for anyone to expect that the occurrence of an accident, such as drilling, etc., caused by the vehicle following the act committed by the defendant. Even if the defendant did not specifically anticipate the occurrence of the death and injury at the time of stopping, it does not interfere with the establishment of the crime of traffic obstruction and injury, as long as the actual result was caused by such traffic obstruction.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles as to causation and predictability necessary for the establishment of an aggravated crime, and the Supreme Court precedents cited in the grounds of appeal are not contrary to such legal principles or are not appropriate to be invoked in this case because the case is different.

4. The appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Ko Young-han (Presiding Justice)