2. The Defendant’s disposition imposing KRW 111,363,00 on the Plaintiff on December 10, 2007 shall be revoked.

3. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant.

The reasons why this Court shall be used for this part of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance shall be as follows: (a) the corresponding part of the reasons for the judgment of the court of first instance (from the second fourth to the second second below). In accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article 420

2. Grounds for illegality alleged by the plaintiff

A. As to the judgment procedure of the first instance court

On May 28, 2010, the court of the first instance, without delivering the briefs (including attached documents; hereinafter the same shall apply) submitted by the defendant to the plaintiff's agent on May 4, 2010, ordered the defendant's litigation performer to state the contents stated in the above briefs and apply for the above documents as evidence at the second date of pleading, which was implemented on May 28, 2010. In addition, on June 30, 2010, the previous argument that "the reason for the disposition of this case is only a donation of trust property under the name of Article 41-2 of the Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act," which was implemented on June 30, 2010, is due to mistake, and that "donation" also constitutes the reason for disposition.

B. Regarding the instant disposition

The reason why this Court is used for this part of the judgment of the court of first instance is as follows: A. The summary of the cause of the plaintiff's claim (the third to the fourth to the fourth fiveth). This is cited in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

3. Determination

A. Relevant statutes

It is as shown in the attached Form.

B. Determination

1) As to the judgment procedure of the first instance court

A) Grounds for the instant disposition

According to the statement No. 3-1-3 of the evidence No. 3, the director of the Namyang District Tax Office may determine the gift tax on December 30, 2002 on the ground that Na donated the instant shares to the Plaintiff on December 30, 2002, notify the Defendant thereof, and recognize the fact that the Defendant imposed gift tax on the Plaintiff accordingly.

B) Progress of litigation

① On April 7, 2010, the first instance court’s date of pleading, which was implemented on April 7, 2010, stated the gist of the argument that “the instant disposition grounds are only deemed as having been donated to the trust property under the name stipulated in Article 41-2 of the Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act,” and the Defendant litigation performer submitted a written statement on May 4, 2010, when the date of adjudication was set on May 7, 2010.”

② On May 28, 2010, the court of first instance, after resumption of the pleading on May 7, 2010, designated the date for the second pleading on May 28, 2010, and received a duplicate receipt from both BB attorneys-at-law of both the Plaintiff’s legal representative on that date (two BB signatures are made on the sign). The Defendant’s legal representative stated the summary of the assertion indicated in the said briefs on the date for the second pleading, and submitted the attached documents in writing (Evidence B No. 9-1, 2, and 10). The court of first instance designated the date for the third pleading on June 30, 2010.

③ On June 29, 2010, after receiving a duplicate directly from the twoB attorney-at-law, the Defendant litigation performer submitted a preparatory document, the purport that “the instant disposition falls under taxation based on the gift.” The Defendant litigation performer stated at the second date for pleading the summary of the claim stated in the above preparatory document, and stated that “the instant disposition is due to the constructive title trust or gratuitous gift, and that “the assertion of taxation due to the title trust is due to an error” in the preparatory document as stated in January 14, 2010. In this regard, the two BB attorney stated in the court that it is difficult to see that there was a transfer under the stock contract only based on the written document as of June 29, 2010 submitted by the Defendant litigation performer, and based on the written statement as of June 29, 2010, the Defendant litigation performer made a statement on the summary of the rebuttal’s claim, “the complaint, relevant preparatory documents, and relevant evidence, etc., the final judgment for the Plaintiff applicant was concluded.

C)Judgment

The legal brief submitted by the Defendant on May 4, 2010 was delivered to both BB attorneys at the date of the second pleading. The allegation that there was a gift from the instant disposition was already included in the legal brief submitted by the Defendant litigation performer on June 29, 2010, prior to the date of the third pleading. As such, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the court of first instance led the Defendant litigation performer to make the said assertion on the third pleading is not persuasive. Even if the court of first instance confirmed that there was a mistake in the previous arguments regarding the instant disposition, this is aimed at clarifying the relationship between the two arguments regarding the instant disposition, and thus, it does not deviate from the limitation of the exercise of the right to ask for clarification. Moreover, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Plaintiff’s grounds for disposition are all subject to the right to object, and the Plaintiff did not immediately raise any objection. The Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

2) Regarding "Gift" among the grounds for the disposition

(a)a fact of recognition;

(1) The NaA actually owned and operated ○○ Construction for the purpose of manufacturing landscaping stone and landscaping works, △△△ Industrial Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “△△ police officer”), △△ Industrial Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “△△ Industry”). The details of shares owned by NaA (based on December 31, 201) and orders for government-funded construction works for the said three companies are as listed below.

(2) On November 30, 2002, the Administrator of the Small and Medium Business Administration amended and publicly announced the Operational Regulations of Group Negotiated Contracts (hereinafter referred to as the “Operational Rules”) by the notification of the Small and Medium Business Administration on November 30, 2002. According to Article 2 Subparag. 2 of the amended Operational Rules, the proportion of government-funded construction works is limited for a single business if a partner company (including a representative), a partner company, a person who is related to a partner company, or a person who is related to a partner company, or an employee thereof, owns at least 50 percent of the total number of shares issued or total amount of shares invested by other partners, solely or in total, (c) if the partner company or a person who is related to a partner company, or an employee thereof owns at least 50 percent of the total number of shares issued or total amount invested by other partners (as for relatives, blood relatives within the

③ On December 30, 2002, NaA (including the current transaction in the name of the wife) filed a final report on each transfer income tax on May 31, 2003 with the Namyang Tax Office, stating that the 3 shares of ○○ Construction Co., Ltd. owned by 15,000 won per share are transferred to 5,000 won per share as indicated below. On the same day, on May 31, 2003, 200, ○○ Construction Co., Ltd., KimD, HandE, NewF, HaF, leG, and HaH also reported on each transfer income tax confirmation report on May 31, 2003 to the Plaintiff.

④ At the time of filing a corporate tax for the business year 2002, three companies submitted a detailed statement of stock fluctuation reflecting the above details of stock transfer.

[Ground for Recognition: Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 8, Gap evidence 9-1 through 4, Gap evidence 10, Gap evidence 11-14, Gap evidence 1,2, Gap evidence 15, 19, Eul evidence 7-1, 2, 3, Eul evidence 8, 11, and the whole purport of the pleadings]

B)Judgment

The plaintiff asserts that the shares of this case were transferred to BA for the purpose of collateral security against BA on the basis of a written confirmation of stock transaction, a written confirmation of payment in kind, and a written certification.

In light of the fact that there is no objective financial data to verify the source or details of lending money that the Plaintiff lent to BA, the Plaintiff was registered as a director or auditor of ○○ Construction, but the actual charge or payment relationship is unclear, and the settlement procedures, such as repayment of principal and interest under the terms of the contract, have not been conducted even after the lapse of eight years from the date of concluding the payment contract in kind, and the above documents are deemed to have been prepared after the instant tax investigation, it is difficult to accept the allegation of payment in kind or security for transfer.

However, since the transfer price of the instant shares was not paid, it is not immediately recognized as a gratuitous transfer, i.e., donation. The transfer of the instant shares is the core mark of the transfer of the property, along with gratuitous transfer. In light of the following circumstances, it is not because it is not because it was actually a transfer of the ownership of the instant shares, or that it was intended to deem that such transaction was made in appearance, rather than because it was a transfer of the ownership of the instant shares.

① As seen above, three companies were able to avoid the application of the same company according to the amended operating rules as a result of large-scale stock transfer with respect to the entire three companies of the same day as the transfer of the instant shares. In light of the fact that Na actually owned and operated three companies, the ratio of government-funded construction works of three companies, the timing of amendment of the operating rules, etc., the said transfer of shares appears to have been planned and connected as a whole, taking into account the operating rules as amended.

② It appears that the instant share transfer price had not been paid, and the number of other shares that took place on the same day also appeared to be the same. However, it is unreasonable to deem that the said three companies were not subject to the government-funded construction order, and that the said shares were actually transferred to the Plaintiff, etc., without compensation. Rather, if the transfer of shares is pretended, it would have the advantage of avoiding the government-funded construction order limit while maintaining ownership.

The instant disposition taken on the premise that the transfer of shares constitutes a gift is unlawful.

3) Of the grounds for disposition, “the deemed donation of title trust property”-related4

The reason why this Court is to be used for this part is "of the reasons for the judgment of the first instance court." This is as stated in the part concerning deemed donation of title trust property (from the fourth nineth to the fifth fifth day). This is cited in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

3. Conclusion

The instant disposition is unlawful. The judgment of the first instance is revoked, and the Plaintiff’s claim is accepted.