On the first ground for appeal

1. In light of the records, the decision of the court below that recognized the Defendant’s repayment of KRW 13,923,00 out of the amount of the obligation to be repaid to the Plaintiff around July 1991 is justified, and there is no error of law by the rules of evidence against the rules of evidence.

2. The argument points out that the repayment of KRW 13,923,00 to the plaintiff is not the defendant but the non-party who purchased forest land subject to provisional seizure from the defendant. However, according to Gap evidence Nos. 8-1 through No. 3 (a request for provisional cancellation, a certificate of personal seal impression, and a statement) the defendant jointly with the defendant for the plaintiff, "I wish to repay KRW 13,923,00 out of the debt that I have to pay to you must pay to you, and no objection is filed after the repayment, etc. will be terminated, and provisional seizure of real estate at the same time as repayment will be terminated and will not be filed." The plaintiff submitted a request for partial repayment of the debt and the request for cancellation of real estate seizure along with his personal seal impression, and it is recognized that the plaintiff received the money, and even if the non-party subrogated to the above money due to the reasons such as the theory of novel theory, this is merely an internal relation between them, and it is still impossible for the plaintiff and the above company.

Therefore, there is no reason to discuss.

With respect to the second and fourth points

1. The repayment of the whole or part of the obligation after the completion of the extinctive prescription can be deemed to have waived the benefit of prescription, barring any special circumstance. The waiver of the benefit of prescription by the partial repayment of the claim is an issue of interpretation of expression of intent, but if the obligation is performed as part of the entire obligation, it can be deemed to have approved the entire claim and given up the benefit of prescription.

In addition, where multiple claims are established for the same kind of business due to continuous transactions between the same parties, an obligor shall be deemed to have granted approval for the remaining obligations, unless there are other special circumstances, even if he/she partly performs the obligation without designating a specific obligation, and thus, the interruption of prescription or renunciation of prescription can be recognized (see Supreme Court Decision 78Da1790, May 13, 1980). However, in cases where the obligation is separate and independent, it cannot be interpreted uniformly only so if the obligor performs the preserved claim for the purpose of removing provisional seizure against the object of provisional seizure, barring any special circumstances, it cannot be deemed that the obligor waives the benefit of extinctive prescription until the separate obligation not indicated as the preserved claim.

2. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that on November 16, 1988, the Plaintiff’s repayment of the above amount of KRW 63 square meters of forest land ( Address 1 omitted), KRW 341 square meters of road ( Address 2 omitted), KRW 356 square meters of the Seoul Civil Court’s loan amount of KRW 85Da3601, and KRW 35,000 of the loan amount of KRW 1,000 on the order of the loan case, which was 35,00,000 and the provisional attachment application was completed with the Busan District Court’s 88Ka24943, and that the Defendant’s repayment of the above amount of KRW 190 on February 17, 1990 should be deemed to have been revoked with the above amount of KRW 130,00,00 of the total amount of the above provisional attachment amount of KRW 130,000,00,000 which had not been approved by the Defendant.

3. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the Defendant’s repayment of KRW 13,923,00,000, which was first attached by the Plaintiff, was paid as a partial repayment of KRW 1,00,000 on the loan decision of Seoul Civil District Court 85 Gohap3601, which was first attached by the Plaintiff. The reasoning of the lower judgment does not mention any question as to what the obligation under the above decision is related to each of the obligations of this case.

If an obligation under the above judgment is an independent obligation established separately from each of the instant obligations, it cannot be deemed that the instant obligation has been approved as a partial performance of the obligation. In addition, if an obligation is based on a final and conclusive judgment, the extinctive prescription period cannot be deemed to have expired since 10 years have elapsed. However, it is difficult to deem that an obligation with respect to each of the instant obligations for which the extinctive prescription has expired due to the partial performance of the obligation prior to the expiration of the extinctive prescription to have been

The judgment of the court below which judged that the defendant renounced the benefit of the extinctive prescription against the whole debt of this case without disclosing the above point, shall not be erroneous in the misapprehension of the reasoning or incomplete hearing.

4. In addition, if the purpose of the Defendant’s repayment of the above money was to cancel a provisional attachment, it is reasonable to regard it as a partial repayment of the guaranteed obligation, barring any special circumstance. If the second provisional attachment made by the Plaintiff as a preserved right on November 15, 1982, part of the balance of the issued promissory note, which is the second provisional attachment, cannot be deemed as a waiver of the benefit of prescription for the obligation of November 15, 1982.

Without merit, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the scope of granting debt approval due to the repayment of provisional seizure debts, thereby failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations.

5. Therefore, the issue is with merit within the extent set out above 3.4.

Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remainder of the grounds of appeal, we reverse and remand the judgment below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)