1. The summary of the facts charged is that the Defendant is in office and driving a CSM 3 car.

On March 22, 2016, around 21:48, the Defendant driven the said vehicle at around 0.053 percent of alcohol concentration in blood (the foregoing Dmark formula substitute calculation) on the street in front of the residence of the Defendant, and driven the said vehicle at about 10 kilometers up to the chill distance located in the Daegu Water-gu Dogdong, Daegu Water-gu.

2. Determination

A. The facts charged in the instant case are premised on the Defendant’s being under the influence of alcohol content of 0.053% at the time of driving. The following reasons are proven to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt.

shall not be deemed to exist.

(1) As a matter of principle, the relevant legal doctrine: (a) there exists an interval between the point of alcohol driving and the point of measurement of the alcohol concentration in blood; (b) the point of time is deemed to increase the alcohol concentration in blood; or (c) the point of time is to increase the time of blood driving and the point of time of measurement of the alcohol concentration in blood can be deemed to be the point of time when the blood alcohol concentration in blood is measured after the latter, the method of applying the rate of alcohol concentration in blood type to the blood alcohol concentration in accordance with the aforementioned drone formula cannot be readily concluded that the blood alcohol concentration in blood at the time of driving is above the standard of punishment.

(2) However, in such cases, the standard value of punishment was above the level of punishment at the time of driving.

Whether it can be seen or not shall be determined reasonably in accordance with logical and empirical rules, comprehensively taking into account various circumstances acknowledged by evidence, such as the interval between driving and measurement, the difference between the value of alcohol concentration and the standard value of punishment, the hours during which drinking continues, the amount of drinking, the driver’s behavior level at the time of crackdown and measurement, and the situation of the accident, if there is a traffic accident, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2013Do6285, Oct. 24, 2013; 2014Do3360, Jun. 12, 2014). The fact that it is proved by the evidence written off (i) the Defendant satisfing alcohol at the Defendant’s house around March 22, 2016; and (ii) the Defendant satisfing alcohol at around March 21, 2016.