2. In a case where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the judgment of the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect them. Although the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the judgment of the first instance court solely on the ground that it is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court, and to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). According to the foregoing legal doctrine, the Defendant had already been punished three times due to a violation of the Road Traffic Act (driving). In particular, the Defendant committed the instant crime without being aware of the suspension of the execution of imprisonment, even though he/she was sentenced to a suspended sentence of imprisonment by driving under the influence of alcohol on or around August 2014, when he/she was under the influence of alcohol by driving under the influence of alcohol.

As such, considering the defendant's criminal records of the same crime, the degree of the alcohol of this case (0.120%) and the distance of the vehicle to operate under the influence of alcohol (including about 20 km) and the situation where the social damage caused by the driving under the influence of alcohol increases, the punishment is light compared to the gravity of the violation, and thus, considering the recent revision of the Road Traffic Act, the sentence against the defendant is inevitable.

In addition, there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the original judgment because new sentencing data has not been submitted in the trial court, and in full view of all the reasons for sentencing specified in the records and arguments of this case, the lower court’s sentencing is too excessive and is not recognized to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion. On the other hand, the lower court explained on the grounds for sentencing that “the traffic accident that occurred while driving a vehicle while driving a vehicle while being on full-time,” but in light of the records of this case, the said traffic accident is