2. In light of the fact that the sentencing based on the statutory penalty is a discretionary judgment that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, and the fact that the sentencing of the first instance court does not change in the conditions for sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it. Although the first instance court’s sentencing falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance court’s judgment and to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court’s opinion on the grounds that it is somewhat different from

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). In light of the following, there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the original judgment as the materials for new sentencing have not been submitted in the trial and the sentencing grounds revealed in the process of the instant pleadings are too large to the lower court’s sentencing, and thus, it does not appear that the lower court’s sentencing exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

3. In conclusion, the defendant's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

However, the habitual nature of the judgment of the court below as of 5th page 12 next to that of the judgment of the court below in accordance with Article 25 (1) of the Regulation on Criminal Procedure: A person shall be corrected by adding "the recognition of dampness" to the judgment of the court below in light of the period of crime, the number of crimes, the number of crimes, and the continuation

.