The lower court sentenced a judgment on November 7, 2018, which was subsequent to the enforcement of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (hereinafter “Revised Act”), which was amended by Act No. 15352 on January 16, 2018, and sentenced the Defendant to the same punishment as the first instance court pursuant to Articles 3 and 56(1) of the Addenda of the amended Act, and, at the same time, issued an employment restriction order for three years, there is no particular disadvantage to the Defendant than maintaining the first instance court judgment.

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2018Do13367, Oct. 25, 2018). Therefore, we cannot accept the allegation in the grounds of appeal that the lower judgment violated the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration.

In addition, the court below's order of employment restriction for three years is just, and there is no violation of law such as incomplete deliberation on the employment restriction order or incomplete reasoning, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

Meanwhile, the argument that the lower court erred in violation of the principle of balanced sentencing or the principle of accountability in the method of examining the sentencing and determining the sentencing constitutes the allegation of unfair sentencing.

However, according to Article 383 subparagraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for more than ten years is imposed, an appeal on the grounds of unfair sentencing is allowed

In this case where a more minor sentence is imposed on the defendant, the argument that the punishment is too unreasonable is not a legitimate ground for appeal.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.