대여금
1. Revocation of a judgment of the first instance;
2. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
3. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
1. In full view of the purport of the entire argument in Gap evidence No. 1 as to the cause of the claim, the plaintiff loaned KRW 4,000,000 to the defendant on September 17, 2006 as the due date for payment, and barring any special circumstance, the defendant is liable to pay the above KRW 4,00,000 to the plaintiff and the delay damages.
2. Judgment on the defendant's defense
A. The defendant asserts that the above loan is a prepaid payment provided as a means of coercion to attract sexual traffic in recruiting a person who has a sexual intercourse, and thus, the plaintiff cannot claim the return of illegal consideration. However, the evidence alone presented by the defendant alone is insufficient to recognize that the above loan is a prepaid payment provided as a means of coercion to attract sexual traffic in recruiting a person who has a sexual intercourse, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it. The defendant's argument in this part is without merit.
B. The defendant's defense of extinctive prescription is defense that the plaintiff's claim of this case against the defendant was extinguished by the lapse of the five-year commercial extinctive prescription period.
In this case, the fact that the plaintiff was operating the main store at the time of the loan of this case does not dispute between the parties, and the plaintiff's act of lending money is presumed to have been conducted for business (see Article 47 of the Commercial Act, e.g., Article 47 of the Commercial Act, and comprehensively considering the overall purport of the argument in the statement in No. 2, the plaintiff actually lent the above money to the defendant in consideration of the fact that the plaintiff is to work as an employee of the main office operated by the plaintiff). Ultimately, the loan claim of this case had already been extinguished at the expiration of the five-year extinctive prescription period from September 17, 201, which was prior
Therefore, this part of the defendant's defense is justified.
3. Thus, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit.