A. The sentence sentenced by the court below to the defendant (two years of suspended sentence for one year of imprisonment) is too unhued and unfair.

B. It is unreasonable that the lower court did not issue an order to disclose or notify the information to the Defendant, even though there are no special circumstances that would not give notice of the Defendant’s personal information exemption from disclosure or notification order.

2. Determination

A. It is desirable to refrain from rendering a sentence without any difference in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court’s judgment on the prosecutor’s unfair argument of sentencing, if the first instance judgment does not change in the conditions of sentencing, and if the sentencing of the first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect them. The first instance judgment is reversed solely on the ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion but is somewhat different from the appellate court’s opinion (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The lower court, as stated in its reasoning, determined a sentence by comprehensively taking into account all the circumstances favorable to the Defendant as well as the unfavorable circumstances of the lower court, as new materials were not submitted in the trial, and there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the lower court’s age, sex, environment, motive, means and consequence of the crime, etc., and the circumstances after the crime, thereby exceeding the scope of discretion.

Therefore, the prosecutor's improper argument of sentencing is without merit.

B. According to Articles 49(1) and 50(1) of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse, a prosecutor’s improper determination on the exemption from disclosure and notification order requires the disclosure and notification of personal information of a person who committed a sexual crime against a child or juvenile in principle, and there are special circumstances that do not constitute such disclosure and notification exceptionally.