2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

A. On November 1, 1984, the registration of ownership transfer was completed in the Plaintiff on November 1, 1984 with respect to the land size of 1864 square meters (hereinafter “D before subdivision”).

B. On December 8, 1975, before the Plaintiff acquired the ownership of D before the division, Gyeonggi-do announced the Gyeonggi-do public notice E, to determine the urban planning road facilities and cadastral approval under the Urban Planning Act for the neighboring land including D before the said division.

C. On January 1, 1985, the Plaintiff intended to divide D before the said division into the building site. Under the above urban planning, the instant real estate was already designated as a road site, and thus, it is not allowed to divide or divide according to the above urban planning, and there was a circumstance that the building permit on the ground that the portion of the said real estate, other than each of the instant land, among the said real estate before the said division, is not a road road.

In accordance with the above urban planning, the Plaintiff filed an application for subdivision with respect to D before the subdivision on January 1, 1985. B B was divided into D 310 square meters, F 59 square meters, G 546 square meters, B 67 square meters, H 259 square meters, and I 13 square meters, respectively.

E. Of the land partitioned as above, the Plaintiff left to be used as a road B before partitioning, and sold the remaining real estate as a site for a building, such as bath, etc.

F. The Plaintiff, at the Seoul Central District Court 92Gahap31489, filed a claim against the Defendant to deliver the said real estate to the Defendant, and to return unjust enrichment from the possession and use of the said real estate, on the ground that the Defendant: (a) carried out the maintenance and repair work without compensation to the Plaintiff; and (b) carried out the maintenance and repair work for concrete and asphalt B prior to the division; and (c) thereby,

The above court is not sufficient to prove that the defendant possessed and managed B prior to the division, and even if it occupies it, the plaintiff is also deemed to possess it.