정보통신망이용촉진및정보보호등에관한법률위반(명예훼손)
The defendant's appeal is dismissed.
In light of the above, the Defendant’s purpose of slandering the Defendant is recognized and the Defendant’s assertion disputing this point is without merit, in full view of the following: (a) the Defendant, by slandering the victim, posted a notice in order to obtain a sense of good faith among the members supporting AE wood.
2) The part of the victim K [2014 high group 4948] did not necessarily require that a person’s name should be explicitly indicated in order to establish a crime of harm to health and reputation with respect to the assertion that the victim was not specified. Thus, the act of publicly alleging false facts does not necessarily require that person’s name should be explicitly indicated. In a case where it is possible to find out which person is identified by comprehensively assessing the contents of the expression in light of the surrounding circumstances and the contents of the expression, the crime of harm to the reputation of the specific person constitutes a crime of defamation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 82Do1256, Nov. 9, 1982; 201Do1226, Mar. 27, 2014). In light of the aforementioned legal principles, in light of the following, the Defendant’s participation in the health care team, “Death*” among the contents expressed by the Defendant, “K,” at least 42 years of age,” “the current pharmaceutical, pharmacy,” and the victim’s “A” and other members of the Defendant Ka.
It is reasonable to view it.
Therefore, in this article, the victim was specified in the Defendant’s notice.
As can be seen, the defendant's argument disputing this part is without merit.
B) As to the assertion that the Defendant’s timely statement is not false, the Defendant stated that the Defendant “the victim was not an executive of the F church youth, but did not audit L but made a false statement.”