2. The plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed.

3. Of the litigation costs, 10% is assessed against the Plaintiff, and the remainder is assessed against the Defendant, respectively.

A. On March 12, 2007, the Plaintiff was recognized as vocational skills development training course for the two courses of “personnel health management and sports skills, etc.” (training method: training method: 5 days (25 hours); hereinafter “the instant curriculum”) for employees who need rehabilitation training as patients suffering from the Defendant having jurisdiction over the location of the entire plant of the Plaintiff Company.

B. From October 22, 2007 to October 26, 2007, the Plaintiff provided the instant curriculum with seven employees subject to the Plaintiff Company’s pre-factory education. On November 9, 2007, the Plaintiff applied for subsidies for vocational skills development training expenses including the instant curriculum. On November 29, 2007, the Defendant received total of KRW 38,511,920 from the Defendant for subsidies including KRW 738,584 for training expenses for the instant curriculum. Of the above subsidies, the Plaintiff’s pre-factory employees for the instant curriculum included KRW 105,512 for training expenses for B, who were trainees of the instant curriculum. The Defendant received a request from the Board of Audit and Inspection and the Ministry of Employment and Labor to investigate whether the Plaintiff was subject to the illegal exit management during the period of vocational skills development training from 00 days to 207.27th July 207, 200.

A person shall be appointed.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1-1, 2, Gap evidence 2, Eul evidence 1-2, Eul evidence 3-1, 2, Eul evidence 4-5, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) The assertion that the Plaintiff does not constitute a false or other unlawful means (the pertinent disposition) refers to any unlawful act committed by an employer who is not eligible to receive subsidies, such as Article 35 of the former Employment Insurance Act or Article 25(4) of the former Occupational Act, in general, to identify that the Plaintiff does not have any grounds for receiving subsidies for vocational skills development training costs at least when the Plaintiff applied for subsidies for training. The instant curriculum has to be aware of the fact that the Plaintiff would not have any grounds for receiving subsidies for the specific trainees at least when the Plaintiff applied for subsidies for training costs. The instant curriculum is a relationship in which the trainees would receive education instead of working uniforms, and have witnessed not only than 0 days, but also 8% of the total number of trainees present at the place of education due to the lack of individual attendance, and thus, it is difficult for the Plaintiff to receive 8% of the total number of trainees present at the place of education and to verify their total number of trainees present at the training course without having any difference in the number of days of attendance at the instant training.

Therefore, each of the dispositions in this case, based on the premise that the plaintiff was paid subsidies for training expenses for B by "a greging or any other unlawful means" under Article 35 of the former Employment Insurance Act or Article 25 (4) of the former Occupational Act, is unlawful.

2) The assertion that the requirements for the additional collection disposition have not been met (related to the second disposition of this case)

The Defendant issued an additional collection of KRW 316,530,00, which is the amount equivalent to three times the Plaintiff illegally received pursuant to Article 25(4)1 of the former Functional Act. However, according to the above provision, the aforementioned additional collection disposition can be made only for those whose recognition of the pertinent training course is revoked pursuant to Article 25(1) of the same Act. Although the Defendant did not revoke the recognition of the training course of this case, it was unlawful that the additional collection disposition was made in accordance with the above provision.

3) The assertion that the underlying statute was mistakenly selected (in particular, relating to the Disposition 3 of this case)

In light of Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act and Article 56(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, which provides that the Defendant shall order the person who received vocational skills development training fees by fraud or other improper means to return subsidies, etc. paid for one year (the period of restriction on payment), but this is unlawful as follows. In other words, with respect to support for vocational skills development projects by business owners, both the Employment Insurance Act and the Occupational Act stipulate that the person who received occupational training should be responsible for the return of the subsidies, etc. It shall be deemed that the Act directly applies to the persons who received occupational training, and the Act provides that the person who received occupational training should be eligible for the return of the subsidies, etc. under the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act, and the Act provides that the person who received occupational training shall be entitled to the exemption of the subsidies, etc. under the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act, and the Act provides that the person who received occupational training shall be entitled to the exemption of the subsidies, etc. under the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act, which is more effective than the Act.

4) Claims relating to the interpretation of the former Employment Insurance Act (as to Disposition 3 of this case)

A) Claim on the disposal deadline

Article 35 (1) of the former Employment Insurance Act shall be interpreted to mean that, on the basis of the time of disposition, the support may be restricted in the future or the return of the amount already provided at the time of disposition, and, on this basis, the provision of Article 56 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act shall be interpreted to be in harmony with the above upper-tier law, where one year has not yet passed from the date of disposition to which the person received or attempted to receive the support by fraud or other improper means, the restriction of support may be taken only when one year has not yet passed from the date of disposition, and where the person received or attempted to receive the support by fraud or other improper means, the return may be ordered if the support was provided in spite of the restriction of support, the third disposition of this case shall be interpreted to have been made after the lapse of one year from November 29, 207, on which the receipt of the subsidy was made, which is in violation of the above laws and regulations.

(b) argument that the subsidy to be returned should be limited to the amount equivalent to the cost of illegal receipt and demand training.

According to the purport of the Supreme Court Decision 2004Du6105, etc., the subject of the order to return under Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act is limited to the amount subsidized by the pertinent fraudulent or other illegal means. The instant disposition is against the law as it exceeds the scope of the subject of return under the above provision, since the Plaintiff, who is not related to the illegal receipt of the instant disposition, properly received training fees, and thus, the pertinent order

(C) the assertion that only the subsidy paid to the workplace at issue should be returned.

In light of the purport that Article 2(9) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Act provides that the training facilities of a person who has obtained recognition of training courses are divided into branches, sub-branches, and training institutes, etc. and the disposition standards are applied to each unit of a branch, sub-branch, training institute, etc., so long as the Plaintiff received the recognition of the curriculum of this case and the payment of subsidies from the Defendant, who is a regional labor office having jurisdiction over the location of the Plaintiff’s pre-factory factory, the scope of return should be limited to the previous factory, and the scope of return should be limited to the relevant workplace under the jurisdiction of the relevant regional labor office, which exercises substantial authority after being delegated by the Minister of Labor as to whether the recognition of the training courses and the decision on the payment of subsidies is determined. In light of the purport that Article 2(9) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Act provides that the training facilities of the person who has obtained recognition of the training courses and the evaluation of the training facilities are operated by the branch, sub-branch, and training institute.

5) The assertion that the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act is unconstitutional (related to the third disposition in this case)

Article 56(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act provides that an order to return a subsidy that has been granted for one year from the date of unfair supply and demand uniformly without prescribing detailed standards, such as an increase, reduction, etc. in accordance with the content and degree of the violation, is null and void in violation of the principle of excessive prohibition under the Constitution due to lack of minimum damage and balance of legal interests. Thus, the third disposition of this case based thereon is unlawful

6) The assertion that it is a deviation or abuse of discretionary power (related to the disposition 3 of this case)

Since the Minister of Labor’s act of subsidizing expenses for vocational skills development training conducted by a business owner under the former Employment Insurance Act or the former Occupational Act is a beneficial administrative disposition, the cancellation, withdrawal, or suspension (including the case of seeking the return of the amount already provided) shall be determined by comparing and comparing with the disadvantage that the other party receives only when it is necessary for the important public interest to justify the infringement of vested rights or when it is necessary to protect a third party’s interests. If the disadvantage that the other party would suffer is enormous than necessary for public interest due to the disposition, it shall be deemed that the discretionary power has been exceeded. The order of the return of the amount of KRW 4,943,501 which the Plaintiff received fairly 50,000,000,000,0000 paid to the other party for three years prior to the fact that the Plaintiff neglected to perform the discretionary management of one trainee and received the subsidy of KRW 105,501,000,000 for

7) The assertion that the extinctive prescription has expired (related to the third disposition of this case)

Article 107 of the Employment Insurance Act provides that the right to receive or return subsidies, unemployment benefits, child-care leave benefits, or maternity or paternity leave benefits shall expire if it is not exercised for three years. Thus, even though the right to receive subsidies and subsidies granted from February 11, 201, which was issued by the third disposition, was already extinguished by prescription, the third disposition of this case including the right to receive subsidies and subsidies granted from February 11, 201 is unlawful.

(b) Related statutes;

It is as shown in the attached Table related statutes.

(c) Fact of recognition;

1) A trainee of the instant curriculum, who is an employee of the Plaintiff Jeonju Factory, was an overseas business trip from October 23, 2007 to October 27, 2007, and was unable to appear for four days from October 23, 2007 to October 26, 2007 in the instant curriculum.

2) However, the attendance book of the instant curriculum was signed by B from October 22, 2007 to October 26, 2007.

3) B did not meet the completion requirements of the instant curriculum due to the failure to attend for four days among the instant curriculum conducted for a total of five days.

[Grounds for recognition] The fact that there is no dispute, Eul's entry of No. 5, and the purport of whole pleading

D. Determination

1) Whether it does not constitute a false or other unlawful manner

A) Sanction against violation of administrative laws is a sanction against the objective fact of violation of administrative laws in order to achieve administrative purposes, and thus, it may be imposed even if the violator has no intention or negligence, barring any special circumstances such as there is a justifiable reason not to cause any negligence on the part of his/her duty. "False or other unlawful means" generally refers to any and all unlawful acts conducted by an unqualified business owner in order to conceal the eligibility for payment or non-qualification for vocational skills development training costs (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Du4272, Jun. 11, 2009).

B) In light of the above legal principles, as long as the above facts were affected by Gap evidence Nos. 4-1 to 3 and Eul evidence Nos. 9, the following circumstances are revealed, i.e., ① before applying for subsidies to the defendant as the implementing entity of the instant curriculum, the plaintiff failed to perform his/her duty to verify whether the trainee was actually present and trained, and applied for subsidies, including training expenses, to Eul, with the credibility of the contents of his/her voluntary statement of attendance. ② Furthermore, the plaintiff's overseas business trip under the plaintiff's approval, and the total number of days of absence of attendance at the instant curriculum is 4 days or more, since the plaintiff could not be seen as being sufficiently aware of the above circumstances, it is difficult to view that the plaintiff's act of not having been present at the instant curriculum 20 days or more, and it is difficult to view that the plaintiff could not be seen as having been present at the instant curriculum due to the plaintiff's failure to meet the above objective requirements for the plaintiff's attendance and management of the curriculum.

Therefore, this part of the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

2) Whether the requirements for additional collection disposition are satisfied

A) According to Article 35(2) of the former Employment Insurance Act, where the Minister of Labor orders a person who received subsidies by fraud or other improper means pursuant to paragraph (1) of the same Article to return subsidies, he/she may additionally collect an amount equivalent to or less than the amount of subsidies received by the person who received subsidies by fraud or other improper means pursuant to the criteria prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Labor. However, Article 25(4)1 of the former Occupational Act applies mutatis mutandis to a person who conducts vocational skills development training under subparagraph 1 of Article 2 of the same Act by fraud or other improper means. Meanwhile, Article 25(1) of the former Occupational Act provides that where a person who received recognition of vocational skills development training course obtains subsidies or loans by fraud or other improper means or intends to obtain such subsidies, the Minister of Labor shall revoke such recognition. According to Article 25(4)1 of the former Occupational Act, Article 22-2 of the Enforcement Decree of the former Occupational Act, and Article 9(1)1(a) of the former Enforcement Rule, the person whose recognition was revoked pursuant to paragraph (1).

B) On the other hand, the defendant ordered the return of KRW 105,510 that the plaintiff illegally received pursuant to Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act and Article 56(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act. In addition, the defendant issued a disposition of additional collection of KRW 316,530,00, the amount equivalent to KRW 105,510, which the plaintiff illegally received pursuant to Article 25(4)1 of the former Occupational Act, was 316,530, which is the amount equivalent to KRW 105,510,00 that the plaintiff illegally received pursuant to Article 25(4)1 of the former Occupational Act. However, according to each of the above provisions, the disposition of additional collection of the above contents is a disposition that can be conducted only for the person whose recognition of the training course was revoked pursuant to Article 25(1) of the former Occupational Act. Since there is no dispute between the defendant and the parties

Therefore, this part of the plaintiff's assertion is justified.

3) Whether the former Employment Insurance Act applies

A) Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act provides that the Minister of Labor may order a person who has received or intends to receive support by fraud or other improper means for employment security and vocational skills development activities referred to in this Chapter ( Chapter III), or who has already received or intends to receive support, as prescribed by Presidential Decree. Article 35(2) of the same Act provides that where the Minister of Labor orders the return under paragraph (1), he/she may additionally collect an amount equivalent to the amount that has been received by fraud or other improper means in accordance with the standards prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Labor. Under the proviso, Article 16(5)1 of the same Act and Article 25(4)1 of the same Act (where the State or a local government implements vocational skills development training upon entrustment), and Article 5(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act provides that the Minister of Labor shall not order the person who has received or intends to receive the subsidy by fraud or other improper means from the date of receipt of the subsidy or other improper means, and Article 56(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act provides that the person who has already received or intends the subsidy.

On the other hand, Article 25 (4) of the former Functional Act is a person whose recognition has been revoked pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (1) or a business owner or employee subject to restrictions on taking lectures or providing loans pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (3).

An order to return all or part of the amount already subsidized or loaned to the employers' organizations, etc. or workplace skill development organizations, and in such cases, the standards determined by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Labor

With respect to the amount of subsidy already received by fraud or other improper means, the amount according to the following classification may be additionally collected from the person whose recognition has been revoked pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph 1, and the amount of additional collection may be collected from the person whose recognition has been revoked by fraud or other improper means.

B) Comprehensively considering the contents of the above provisions, where an employer has obtained training costs (in such cases, training costs shall be paid from the Employment Insurance Fund created with employment insurance premiums, etc. under the former Employment Insurance Act) by false or other unlawful means in conducting workplace skill development training courses with recognition from the Minister of Labor pursuant to the former Act, the employer shall not impose various sanctions prescribed in Article 25 of the former Occupational Act (in such cases, cancellation of recognition, restriction on recognition, provision or restriction on loans, order to return illegal payments, and order to return additional collection), and Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act and Article 56(1) and (2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act shall not apply to those who have received or intend to obtain training costs by false or other unlawful means, and the remaining provisions of the former Employment Insurance Act shall not be applied to those who have received or attempted to receive training costs by fraudulent or other unlawful means, and Article 35(1) and (3) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act shall not apply to those who have received or were subject to restriction on the aforementioned provisions of the former Employment Insurance Act.

4) Determination on the interpretation of the former Employment Insurance Act

A) Whether the disposal deadline has been expired

Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act provides that the Minister of Labor may order a person who has received or intends to receive support from a person who has received or intends to receive support from employment security and vocational skills development projects under this Chapter (Chapter III) by fraud or other improper means, to restrict the payment of such support or to return the subsidy already received, as prescribed by Presidential Decree. Article 56(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act provides that the Minister of Labor shall order the person who has received or intends to receive the subsidy by fraud or other improper means under Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act to return the subsidy already received or intends to receive. Article 56(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act provides that the Minister of Labor shall order the person who has received or intends to receive the subsidy, etc. under paragraph (1) for one year from the date on which he/she received or applied for the subsidy, etc., to return the subsidy, etc. for which the Minister of Labor does not impose a restriction on the payment of the subsidy under Article 56(2).

B) Whether the subsidies to be returned should be limited to the amount equivalent to the training expenses for illegal receipt or payment, based on Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act and Article 56(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act. Article 56(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act does not provide, or intend to receive, any subsidies, etc. for one year from the date on which the subsidies, etc. were received or intended to be received by false or other unlawful means, and if the subsidies, etc. are not paid within the payment restriction period, it is intended to order the return thereof to be ordered. Accordingly, the subsidies, etc. paid during the “payment restriction period” subject to return pursuant to Article 56(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act do not need to be paid by fraudulent or other unlawful means (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Du2584, Apr. 15, 2010). Unlike the above, the Plaintiff’s assertion that this portion of the subsidy should not be limited to the amount equivalent to the repayment period.

C) Article 27 of the former Employment Insurance Act provides that "the Minister of Labor may subsidize expenses incurred in vocational skills development training prescribed by Presidential Decree to improve the vocational ability development of insured workers, etc., as prescribed by Presidential Decree." Article 35 (1) of the same Act provides that "the Minister of Labor may order a person who has received or intends to receive subsidies in relation to vocational skills development training to restrict employment security and vocational skills development training under the provisions of this Chapter or to return already subsidies, as prescribed by Presidential Decree." Article 56 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that "the Minister of Labor shall order a person who has received or is to receive subsidies or vocational skills development training under the provisions of this Chapter by fraud or other improper means to restrict employment security and vocational skills development training under the provisions of this Chapter or to return subsidies or subsidies to the person who has received or intends to receive subsidies by fraud or other improper means under the provisions of each subparagraph of paragraph (1) of Article 35 (1) of the same Act shall not apply for one year from the date of receiving subsidies, incentives, or vocational skills development training allowances or training allowances (the Minister of Labor shall order to return them within the scope of the above."

5) Whether Article 56(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act is unconstitutional

A) The disposition ordering the establishment of the provision of Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act and Article 56(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (hereinafter “Enforcement Decree clause”) and the establishment of the enforcement Decree of the same Act, or the establishment of the period of restriction on payment, and the return of subsidies paid during the period of restriction on payment, constitutes a binding act. However, it is problematic whether the enforcement decree provision of the instant case, which provides that those who have received or attempted to receive vocational skills development training costs, etc. by false or other unlawful means (hereinafter “unlawful recipients”) according to the delegation under Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act, must be mandatory against the person who has received or attempted to receive vocational skills development training costs, etc. by means of fraudulent or other unlawful means, and shall be ordered to refund training costs, etc. paid

B) In light of the fact that workplace skill development training is conducted with limited public resources, such as the Employment Insurance Fund under the Employment Insurance Act, etc., the legislative purpose of the instant provision is to prevent unlawful acts related to the payment of training expenses, etc. and ultimately to promote the development and improvement of workplace skill of workers through the restriction on the payment of training expenses, etc. for one year for the illegal recipient and the order to refund subsidies paid within the restriction period for the payment of training expenses, and that workplace skill development training is conducted through limited public resources, such as the Employment Insurance Fund under the Enforcement Decree of the instant case, the legislative purpose of the instant provision is justifiable. In addition, since it appears that improper acts related to the payment of training expenses, etc. are to be reduced through disciplinary sanctions as stipulated

However, as seen below, the enforcement decree of this case is in violation of the Constitution as a provision that excessively infringes on the property rights of the remaining illegal recipients who lack the requirement of "minimum degree of damage" or "a balance of legal interests."

(1) In addition to ordering the return of subsidies, etc. already paid pursuant to Article 35(2) of the former Employment Insurance Act, Article 35(2) of the same Act provides that an amount equivalent to or less than the amount paid by fraud or other improper means may be collected as a punitive meaning. Accordingly, Article 25(4)1 of the former Occupational Act, Article 22-2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, and Article 9(1) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act provides that the amount to be additionally collected shall be calculated based on the number of times the applicant applied for expenses by fraud or other improper means during the past five years. Meanwhile, apart from the aforesaid additional collection disposition, the pertinent provision of the Enforcement Rule of the same case provides that the amount of subsidies paid within the said restriction period shall be limited to the amount of subsidies paid for one year, and at the same time, the order to return the subsidies paid within the said restriction period shall be issued. On the other hand, unlike the aforementioned additional collection disposition, the instant provision has the nature of punitive sanctions, and it only provides for the restriction of payment and the return order for one year.

Therefore, the Defendant, like the Plaintiff, has to uniformly impose the above sanctions against the business owner who is a small amount of illegal demand. The subsidies subject to the order to return are considerably larger than the ordinary amount of illegal demand, which may be expected by the illegal recipient. This may result in an excessive harsh outcome in light of the content and degree of the violation (in the case of the Plaintiff, the amount of the illegal demand is 105,510, while the amount of the subsidies paid during the period of restriction on payment is 4,943,578,61 won, and the subsidies paid during the period of restriction on payment is 4,943,578,61 won, which is 46,854 times the amount of the above illegal demand. Accordingly, the Defendant ordered the Plaintiff to return KRW 4,943,5

(2) In addition, since the provision of this case specifies the initial date of the restriction on payment as "the date on which the application for payment was made" rather than the date of the sanction, the illegal recipient shall return retroactively the amount already received prior to the sanction. If the illegal recipient knew in advance that the payment of training expenses, etc. would be restricted for one year, he could reduce the amount of the training course during the restriction on payment period by flexibly implementing the training course during the restriction on payment period, and it cannot be deemed unfair to operate the training course. Ultimately, even if the provision of this case prescribes the restriction on payment as the continuous act of this case, the initial date of the restriction on payment of training expenses, etc. can not be deemed to have complied with the minimum principle of damages suffered by the illegal recipient by separately prescribing the initial date of the application for payment. (3) Moreover, the provision of this case does not provide for the "training expenses" or the order for return of the subsidy already paid during the restriction on payment period from the "date on payment" to the "date on which the application for payment was made," but does not provide for any special restriction on the status of the recipient.

(4) Therefore, even if the legislative purpose of this case can be more efficiently achieved by stipulating the provision of the Enforcement Decree of this case, which is a disciplinary measure, in addition to the additional collection disposition against the illegal recipient, the provision of the Enforcement Decree of this case, which is a disciplinary measure, provides for the restriction on payment for one year and the order to return the subsidy paid during the restriction period, without setting detailed standards depending on the attitude of the illegal recipient’s act, violates the property rights of the illegal recipient by excessively restricting it (On the other hand, Article 56(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act amended by Presidential Decree No. 22026 of February 8, 2010, which provides for one year restriction on payment to the illegal recipient, and it appears that the provision of this case’s provision provides for the restriction on payment for three years after the date of receipt of the subsidy or the subsidy and the amount of subsidy received or to receive is less than three million won for the first time, which is a new one-year restriction on payment under Article 15(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act or one-year restriction on payment of the subsidy.

C) Therefore, since the disposition of this case, which was made based on the provision of the Enforcement Decree of this case, is unlawful, it shall be revoked (it shall not be further determined as to the Plaintiff’s assertion that the disposition of this case 3 was abused or abused the discretion or that it was unlawful as a disposition after the completion of the extinctive prescription)

6) Sub-decisions

Ultimately, the part of the Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant sought revocation of the return order of KRW 105,510 for training costs for vocational skills development, which the Defendant had against the Plaintiff on November 22, 2010, is without merit. The part of the Plaintiff’s claim seeking revocation of the return order of KRW 316,530 for the Plaintiff on November 22, 2010 and additional collection of KRW 316,530 for the Plaintiff on February 11, 2011, is with merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is justified within the scope of the above recognition, and the remaining claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Yoon Dok-be

Judges Kim Gin-young

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.