(b) Practice that contains an error in the recognition of constructive confession.

The appeal by the Plaintiff New He Co., Ltd. and the appeal by the Plaintiff Native Co., Ltd. and the appeal by the Plaintiff Native Co., Ltd. are all dismissed.

In light of the records, on September 17, 1959, with regard to the part of the claim for damages due to the loss of the plaintiff New Red Co., Ltd.'s main ship of this provisional attachment, the court below's judgment was adopted, taking into account all the evidence adopted by the defendant as to the part of the claim for damages due to the loss due to the loss of the plaintiff's new ship of this case of this case of this corporation, the defendant was placed in the ship shelter, which was the most stable place in the plaintiff's main ship of this case of the provisional attachment at the time, due to a typhoon's failure to do so, and the plaintiff's vessel being moored near the ship's main ship of this case at the time, was damaged or destroyed due to a typhoon's primary storm, and under the circumstances at that time, the court below determined that there was a circumstance that the ship manager could not be exempted from such damage as above even if the ship manager managed the ship's care with due care, and there was no reason to suspect that there was a violation of misunderstanding of the law without taking account of evidence by the obligee's duty to manage evidence.

It shall be judged on the second ground of the same title.

1. In light of the records, the original judgment was based on Gap evidence Nos. 20, 21, 24. The facts as stated in its reasoning are acknowledged (it does not affect the conclusion of the judgment in this case even if there was any mistake as to the content of the title of debt owed by provisional attachment), and in light of such facts, the defendant, other than a legal expert, filed a criminal complaint with the defendant believed that the act of the plaintiff's moving-in, who interfered with the removal of the main building by the execution of Egypt constitutes the crime of interference with business, and it cannot be readily concluded that there was negligence in the complaint or that the act was used for obstruction of the right to file a complaint. Thus, there was no reason to suspect that there was any error in fact-finding of the nature that could affect the judgment to reject the claim for compensation for material and mental damage due to detention or other conditions caused by the plaintiff's complaint by the plaintiff's moving-in's accusation, or that there was an error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles, which

2. In addition, even though the movable property provisionally attached by the defendant was owned by the same person in the nature of the daily use of the plaintiff 2, its execution method (the method of keeping signs or objects attached) was impossible, and there is no evidence to recognize that the provisional attachment was damaged or reduced due to the above plaintiff's impossibility of use due to the above plaintiff's provisional attachment, or that there is no evidence to prove that the above plaintiff suffered damage as to the above plaintiff due to the provisional attachment, and even though the provisional attachment was a tool owned by the same person in the nature of the daily use, it cannot be said that there was an error of rejecting the claim. However, even if the judgment of provisional attachment was executed with respect to the above plaintiff's mental suffering, it can be inferred in light of the empirical rule that there was a mental suffering in the above plaintiff who was provisionally seized for a long time, the judgment of provisional attachment against the above plaintiff's mental suffering cannot be said to have affected the above plaintiff's reputation, and if the judgment of provisional attachment was executed, it did not affect the above plaintiff's reputation of the above plaintiff.

We decide on the first ground for appeal by the defendant's attorney.

In light of the records and records, the defendant did not discuss the above measures because the defendant had to prohibit the use of 6 vessels owned by new interest companies of the plaintiff corporation by enforcing provisional attachment on 12 March 1958 and sold 10,400 won to the wharf from March 12, 1958 to October 20 of the same year, and there is no reason to suspect that the plaintiff corporation violated the rules of evidence by taking measures to recognize the fact that 10,400 won was caused by the collision with the vessel, and that the plaintiff corporation violated the rules of evidence (the statement part concerning the above acceptance during the plaintiff's questioning result stated in the lawsuit was about the reasons for the acceptance as well as about the reasons for the above fact-finding because it cannot be said that the part of the statement about the above acceptance during the plaintiff's questioning result stated in the lawsuit was about the reasons for the acceptance).

It shall be judged on the second ground of the same title.

As pointed out in theory, it is clear that the defendant dealt with the above plaintiff's assertion as to the tonnage of each of the above 5 wooden vessels, which was executed by the provisional seizure as above by the plaintiff 1 company (the plaintiff's argument is sufficient to deny it, and it does not require any other assertion as to facts contrary to the alleged facts) on the record concerning the claim for damages equivalent to the rent for five wooden vessels, which was executed by the plaintiff 1 company (the plaintiff's argument is not sufficient to deny it) and the plaintiff 2's inquiry is clearly stated in the 1 to 5th of the evidence No. 26 of the above provisional seizure as the result of the plaintiff 2's questioning, and the judgment is clearly stated in the 1, 2, 3, 50 tons of each of the above 10 tons of new interest vessels among the above 150 tons of the above plaintiff's provisional seizure vessels, and it is not clear that the plaintiff's assertion was affirmed (the plaintiff's assertion as to the affirmative denial). It is therefore justified.

Therefore, according to the part of each appeal by the original defendant, etc. which is deemed reasonable in the above judgment, each part of the original judgment shall be reversed, and all of the appeals regarding other parts shall be dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges pursuant to Articles 400 and 406 of the Civil Procedure Act.

Justices of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) Ma-dong and Kimchi-galle