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(영문) 광주고등법원 2019.03.28 2018노337

성폭력범죄의처벌등에관한특례법위반(13세미만미성년자강제추행)

Text

The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

1. Prosecutor’s grounds of appeal: The sentence imposed by the lower court (two years and six months of imprisonment, and three years of suspended execution) is too unhued and unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. The sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, and the discretionary determination is made within a reasonable and reasonable scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing as prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act.

However, considering the unique area of sentencing of the first instance court that is respected under the principle of trial priority and the principle of directness taken by our Criminal Procedure Act and the nature of the ex post facto review of the appellate court, it is reasonable to reverse the unfair judgment of the first instance court only in cases where it is deemed that the judgment of the first instance court exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion when comprehensively considering the conditions of sentencing in the course of the first instance sentencing review and the sentencing criteria, etc., or where it is deemed unfair to maintain the first instance sentencing as it is in full view of the materials newly discovered in the course of the appellate court’s sentencing review.

In the absence of such exceptional circumstances, it is desirable to respect the sentencing of the first instance court in the absence of such exceptional circumstances.

(see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). (B)

The circumstances alleged by the prosecutor as an element of sentencing in the trial court have already been withdrawn during the oral proceedings of the court below, and there is no particular change in the situation in the sentencing guidelines and the conditions of sentencing after the sentence of the court below was pronounced.

The circumstances indicated by the lower court as the grounds for sentencing and the Defendant temporarily denied the fear of punishment after a confession at an investigative agency, but after the lower court recognized the instant crime, it is against depth. The Defendant’s age is 76 years old and under medical treatment upon the workplace’s malicious life diagnosis on November 2, 2018, including the Defendant’s character and behavior, environment, motive for and method of the crime, details and method of the crime, relationship between the Defendant and the victim, and circumstances after the crime.