Residential Dongbacheon -

[Reference domicile] Chuncheon City

2. A fixed01 (651101 - 1) staff member of the Korea Water Resources Corporation.

Residence City - - Residence

Busan - Original domicile

3. High 02 (690327 - 1), construction of the annual Gun Office, and notification for local facilities in charge;

Housing Dongbcheon-si -

Standard place of registration Dongbcheon City

Law Firm Dongin, Attorney Lee Han-han (Defendant 01)

Attorney Jeong-hee (Attorney Go-hee et al., Counsel for defendant Go-young)

Defendant 50,000 won converted into one day if the above fine is not paid by Defendant 1

shall be confined in a workhouse.

Defendant 1, Defendant 1, Defendant 1, Defendant 1

Defendant High 02 was a person on duty in the construction of the National Agency of Incheon-gun and a local facility assistant (Grade VII), and on September 5, 2009: 00 to September 6, 209: 09:0 to 00:00; and was a worker on duty in the disaster situation room in the National Agency of Incheon-gun.

In preparation for the occurrence of a sudden breakdown by the centralized rain or the dam outflow of North Korea, the head of the Seocheon-gun Office established a disaster forecast and alert system, and established a liaison and cooperation system with the Water Resources Corporation, the fire station, the police, and the military unit, and designated the workers on duty in the disaster situation room separately from the general workers on duty. The workers on duty in the disaster situation room has the duty to check the abnormal change in the level of the advanced lecture level while monitoring CCTV images installed in the scopic, the North Tropic, the scopic, the scopic, the scopic, the scopic, the scopic, the scopic, the scopic, the scopic, and the scopic, etc. of the scopic. In addition, if the level of the scopic curriculum exceeds three meters, the head of the competent agency should immediately notify the relevant agency of the change of the level of the scopic.

Defendant High 02 was ordered to thoroughly monitor the level of the instant river. In fact, around August 27, 2009, Defendant High Doctrine had a duty of care to thoroughly monitor the level of the instant river as a worker on duty in the disaster situation room, since the water level of the instant river was over 10 meters due to the discharge of the Yellow Dam in North Korea.

However, Defendant 02 neglected to confirm the change of water level of strong rain plates and CCTV monitors during work on duty. Accordingly, Defendant 02 did not take any measure such as the rapid increase of the water level of the Jinby River at around 03:0 on September 6, 2009 (one day: 06: 69 meters at the highest water level at about 0: 10: 00 on the same day) by releasing the Jinby River without permission on September 6, 2009; Defendant 1 did not take any measures to ensure the rapid increase of the water level of the Jinby River at around 06:00,000 on September 6, 2009: around 05:25:00 from the Jinby River Station at around 25:00 on September 6, 2009; Defendant 1 did not know the remainder of the Minby River at around 07:0 on the date of installation of the radio warning system at around 07:0.

Defendant High 02’s notification and warning measures that must be carried out due to the above occupational negligence are not carried out at all, and on the same day: 05:20-05: U.S. Myeongsan-gun around 40:40

At around 20, the victim 99 (the 41 years of age), 098 (the 39 years of age), 97 (the 196 (the 39 years of age), 95 (the 12 years of age) and 07 days of the same day, who were camping in the Yacheon-gun, Yacheon-gun, the Yacheon-gun, the 196 (the 39 years of age), 195 (the 39 years of age) and 07 days of the same day: the victim Kim 94 (the 40 years of age) who was making fishing in the Yan-gun, the Yacheon-gun, the Yacheon-gun, the Yacheon-gun, the Y

Summary of Evidence

1. A statement made by Defendant 102 to the effect that the breach of duty of care in the first trial record is recognized;

Statement

1. Statement of witness 93 in the fifth trial records;

1. Protocol of inspection by this Court;

1. Among each prosecutor's interrogation protocol against Defendant High 02, the prosecutor did not mislead Defendant High 02 at the time of the instant accident.

In addition, it is believed that if the water level of the lag lag increases rapidly, light, etc. in the situation room will be sound.

An education course on the method of using warning systems has been neglected to verify friendly and CCTV, and prior to towing;

A statement to the effect that at the time of receipt, the method has been forgotten;

1. An interrogation protocol of the suspect to the prosecution concerning the head 92;

1. Each police statement of west 91, Choi 90, Lee 89, Lee 88, Lee 87, Park 86, Kim 85, Park 93, Park 84, Park 83, Park 82

Protocol

1. Situation Report (No. 1 of evidence);

1. Duty and order for situation service (No. 23 of the evidence list);

1. Guidelines for Action of Workers on Duty (No. 24 of the evidence list);

1. An investigation report (whether residents' warning broadcasting is heard at the accident site and No. 27 of evidence list);

1. Investigation report (37 No. 37 related to disaster preparedness education and evidence list);

1. Investigation report (related to the disaster situation room, No. 38 of evidence);

1. The actual survey report (No. 53 of the evidence list);

1. Operational regulations of the disaster situation room in the Seocheon-gun-gun (Evidence List No. 124);

1. A copy of work site for a disaster situation (No. 125 of the evidence list);

1. Investigation report (The current status of building a disaster forecast and warning system of the National Agency of Incheon National Armed Forces and No. 129 of evidence);

Application of Statutes

1. Relevant Articles of criminal facts;

Article 268 of the Criminal Code

1. Competition;

Articles 40 and 50 of the Criminal Act

1. Selection of penalty;

Selection of Fines

1. Detention in a workhouse;

Articles 70 and 69(2) of the Criminal Act

Reasons for both punishment

The defendant's negligence became one of the causes of the loss of life. However, it is apparent that the main responsibility of such a significant result is on the North Korean side where the dam was discharged without permission, and the flood forecast and warning system operated by the Korea Water Resources Corporation was overlapped at the time. The defendant's mistake contributed only to a relatively small part of the result.

On the other hand, the defendant was detained for 119 days until he was released on bail, and he was suffering from a lot of severe severe pain during a trial period near two years, and this alone is judged to have reached a large part of the criminal value. In addition, the defendant has no criminal records so far, and even a public official is also a public official.

Faithful work has been on duty.

Considering these various circumstances, the defendant was punished as a fine and the amount was determined.

Not guilty portion (Defendant 00, 101)

1. Summary of the facts charged

Defendant Song 00 is a person in charge of the operation and management of the Hanjin River system (hereinafter referred to as the “instant system”) as an agent in charge of the operation and management of the Hanjin River Construction Team at the Hanjin River Construction Team at the Korea Water Resources Corporation, and is the senior person in charge of the operation and management of the instant system. The senior person 01 is the senior person in charge of the operation and management of the instant system as the senior person in charge of the aforementioned system operation and management as the senior person in charge of the Han River Construction Team.

A. The defendant's act of negligence by 00

(1) The instant system is designed to indicate the water level level on the web screen of the integrated alarm system in - 1 - to record the server in the same value as the normal water level information in the case where the water level information installed in the galvology of the galvology was failed to measure the water level or was unable to transmit the water level information above the failure or communication of the remote transmission device (hereinafter referred to as “RTU”). In the event that the water level information was generated in the galvology of the galvine or after the decision, it was designed to confirm the operation of the system in a fixed manner by sending text messages that read “the occurrence of water level phenomenon”, “the rise of water level”, “the rise of water level” to the operator.

However, when the Defendant received the above text messages frequently due to the conclusion, the Defendant revised the program to record the level of “(1) 12 January 2, 2009,” which made the control software of the instant system, by demanding 81 employees of 1% Mad new$ 51, which made the control software of the instant system, as ‘the normal transmission value immediately before’.

On July 29, 2009, this 81 revised the program to record the problem of the system of this case by requesting the Defendant to check the problem, and the program to record it as 0 '0'. After such revision, the system of this case was aware that the water level was changed at the time of the failure and sent text messages to the Defendant several times, recognizing that the water level was changed at the time of the failure. Accordingly, on August 7, 2009, the Defendant demanded this 81 to revise the program to recognize the water level at the immediately preceding normal acquisition, despite the explanation of this 81 that there is a concern that the problem may arise, by requiring the Defendant to revise the program again, the program could have been changed, and thus, the manager deleted the function of checking and verifying the system by receiving text messages at the time of an error and malfunction.

In revising a program as above, the Defendant knew that it is difficult for the Defendant to easily understand any system error or water level malfunction, such as the failure of a deceptive scheme or the malfunction, communication malfunction, etc., which is the cause of the failure, and requested the correction, and did not take any measures to find any other way to verify the above error or malfunction or to improve the system.

Therefore, even though the RTU failed to transmit information on the server due to its failure on September 5, 2009: 53, the system of this case did not send text messages, recognizing the water level as the normal acquisition value immediately before the normal acquisition value, which led to the failure of the system operators to know of the breakdown of the RTU that lasted for a long time.

(2) The instant system was set to send the text message of “in the event that the measured water level rise is 40 centimeters between one minute and 40 centimeters,” and the text message of “in the case of 30 minutes and 50 centimeters between 30 minutes, the rise in water level” to the cellular phone of the operators including the Defendant.

However, on August 7, 2009, when the Defendant received a large number of text messages due to frequent breakdowns in the instant system, the Defendant arbitrarily changed the water level rise range between 1 minute and 300cm between 30 minute and 500cm between 30 minute and 30 minute, thereby making the Defendant use of the text messages as effective and lost its effectiveness.

( 3 ) 피고인은 2009 . 7 . 경 이 사건 시스템에서 각 국 사이의 통신 , 통제국의 시스 템 서버 기능 , 수위국 장비에서 이상이 생기는 등 전반적인 문제가 발생하자 설치업체 인 한 & ^ # ( * 개발에 하자보수를 요청하였으나 보수가 이루어지지 않았다 . 이에 피고인은 업무총괄자인 정01과 함께 자체적인 점검을 하여 시스템 전반에 많은 문제가 있음을 확인하였다 .

In such a case, the Defendant should have been ordered to report the truth to the head of the Han River Construction Team Kim80, the head of the Jin River Construction Team, and the head of the Jin River Construction Group 79, and have taken measures so that the system can be operated normally through the overall system inspection at the level of the Water Resources Corporation.

Nevertheless, the Defendant, on August 20, 2009, prepared and submitted a false report to the effect that there is no problem in the light system and works normally, but only in need of continuous monitoring, and did not take any measures, thereby checking the system overall.

In other words, it was prevented from being able to repair a sudden breakdown.

(4) The instant system was sent to Defendant 1, 101, and other press officials and employees, even if it is possible to conduct immediate inspection and repair when an abnormal communication occurs.

On August 24, 2009, the Defendant heard the horses of complaints from the employees who frequently received text messages due to frequent breakdown of the instant system, and on August 24, 2009, the Defendant was unable to receive text messages by changing the recording from the management class to the general class, such as the receipt of text messages, other than the Defendant, to the general class, and the Defendant was entirely unable to know the communication level.

(5) On September 4, 2009, the Defendant: (a) connected the CDM method to the server, which was removed by repair prior to around 00:0; (b) requested this81 to register the phone number on the server; (c) did not completely check whether the registration was made; and (d) whether the communication between the controlled country and the warning country was made.

This 81, upon receipt of a request for registration of numbers from the Defendant, was late 9.5.22:07 to 22:39, and the communications with each warning country was inspected three times, but all four warning countries did not respond.

(6) On August 27, 2009, the RTU, the main equipment of the instant system, did not recognize that the level of the JTU exceeded 10 meters (around August 27, 2009, the level of the GTU was 1057, but there was no need to urgently replace it.

그럼에도 불구하고 , 피고인은 정01과 김80에게 사전보고도 하지 아니한 채2009 . 9 . 4 . 경 15 : 00부터 17 : 00 사이에 수자원공사로부터 RTU 설치를 도급받았던 업체가 아 닌 ' % $ ^ # ' 의 김78로 하여금 기존 RTU와 다른 기종의 RTU로 교체하게 하였다 .

In addition, there is a possibility that Kim 78 might be a problem of cables connected to the water level system rather than its own problem, and the defendant did not review the possibility of functional errors and allowed Kim 78 to perform the simplification of cables that are connected directly to the RTU by separately deducting lines from cables associated with the rash gauge and the existing common distribution system at the Han River Flood Control Station that manages the water level gauge and the distribution system without undergoing a review of the possibility of functional errors.

In addition, the Defendant had frequently caused the TRU before the replacement, and on August 27, 2009, it could be sufficiently anticipated that the TRU could occur at any time due to the discharge of the Yellow Dam from North Korea. Accordingly, even though the replaced RTU had to check when normal operation without the same problem as the transfer, it was necessary to check when the changed RTU continued to operate the normal operation on September 4, 2009 after 2 hours and 30 minutes from the replacement, only one inspection at around 30 minutes after the replacement, and no inspection or monitoring was conducted thereafter.

On September 22, 2009, the changed RTU sent the 230's water level information to the system server on September 5, 2009, and then caused the failure to transmit the 230's water level information. Although the actual water level continues to rise continuously, the system server continued to record the 230's water level according to the information that was received from around 22:53 on the same day and immediately preceding before the processing of the water level information. On June 03: 00 on the following day, even though the 3-meter water level reaches three meters, each warning station did not display the warning broadcasting.

(7) The Defendant received text messages from September 5, 2009 to September 00: 38, 200: from September 6, 200: 0:38 to September 38, 200: seven times for satellite communications due to the satellite communications of the warning country and the MMA communications, and 11 times for CD communications.

On the other hand, around August 24, 2009, the Defendant was allowed to receive only text messages informing more than the communications level as above, and it was well known that other persons are unable to know more than the communications level. In addition, the Defendant installed a remote connection program at his own discretion on the Korean Water Resources Corporation’s computer network, which is prohibited from accessing the outside, and thus, the Defendant was able to confirm the water level or control the warning station by accessing the instant system upon receiving text messages from the warning station and the water level station.

Therefore, the Defendant’s access to the system immediately after the transmission of text messages, thereby checking whether there is anything wrong with the Defendant, and then taking necessary measures against the pertinent warning station. Moreover, the Defendant received text messages from the warning station until September 6, 200:38, prior to the rise in the level of the Plaintiff’s entrance and exit, and then, the Defendant continued to have access to the system, on the other hand, was recorded as 230’s water level, and immediately became aware of the TRU failure.

Nevertheless, even after receiving the aforementioned text messages, the Defendant did not confirm the existence of such messages through the mobile phone, and did not take any measures such as reporting or notifying to anyone.

(8) In the event of a problem in the instant system, the Defendant was well aware of the fact that any person other than the Defendant is unable to know and take necessary measures. Therefore, the Defendant remains within a distance from which he can immediately confirm the system, and, in the event of long-distance withdrawal, takes over the duties to take necessary measures to others, and frequently check the connection status of the only number of single cell phoness that can be notified of more than the instant system.

The Defendant, like the above (7) 15:00 on September 5, 2009, when receiving text messages for continuous communications or text messages, began to be in Gyeong-nam in order to read staff members of the Dong fee, and it was impossible to receive any notification because it was left alone even though the cell phone from the Do became out of the lack of distribution.

B. The act of negligence by Defendant 101

(1) As at the time of the completion of the instant system, the Defendant was well aware that the system should not be modified at will, since the Defendant was acting as the competent supervisor and signed and sealed by the supervising supervisor.

From Song 00, the Defendant told that the program would be modified as described in the above A. (1). Accordingly, the Defendant knew well that it would make it difficult to easily understand any system error or any abnormal phenomenon, such as the failure or malfunction of the RTU, communication, etc., which is the cause of the connection, and rather did not allow the program modification, and rather did not take any other measures or take measures to improve the system.

Therefore, even though the RTU failed to transmit information on the server due to its failure on September 5, 2009: 53, the system of this case did not send text messages that have occurred above the level of "in the case of continuous recognition of water level as the normal acquisition value," and the system operator could not know the breakdown of the RTU that lasted for a long time.

(2) The Defendant, like the above A. (3), checked the instant system with 00, and confirmed a lot of problems.

In such a case, the Defendant should have received instructions by reporting the truth to the head of the Han River Construction Team Kim80 and the head of the YG 79, and have taken measures, such as repair of defects, through the overall system inspection at the level of water resource construction, so that the system can operate normally.

Nevertheless, on August 20, 2009, the Defendant reported to the effect that there is no problem in the light system and works normally, and that continuous monitoring is required only, and did not take any measures, and thereby prevented the Defendant from executing an overall inspection of the system or repair of each trouble.

(3) The Defendant was registered as the operator of the instant system from July 1, 2009 to August 19, 2009, and received 93 copies of communications and text messages. As such, the Defendant was aware of more than the communications of each warning country.

On the other hand, the Defendant came to know that the Defendant changed the class of other persons so that it can receive text messages only like the above A. (4), and thus, the Defendant should maintain the instant system by providing education to ensure that an addressee should not be changed as the function of sending text messages was prepared to prepare against the management and risk of the instant system, allowing an addressee to check what is the grounds for communication and to report the result to Kim80, etc., and taking appropriate measures to ensure that text messages should not be sent to other operators except for Song 00, by leaving the Defendant neglect to take any measures that the Defendant thought that it would be well in the system management without taking any other measures.

(4) On August 27, 2009, when the level of the Jinjin River exceeded 10 meters, the RTU did not recognize the level of 10 meters (in spite of the rise to 1057's level, '57', '57') and there was no reason to change it rapidly.

On August 27, 2009, the Defendant told that he would leave the company from 00 to check the TRU, and on September 4, 2009, the Defendant said that he would repair the TRU to the Defendant. In such a case, the Defendant would have to ascertain what he would repair in advance the TRU, to immediately report or directly confirm the repair contents, and to check whether the TRU, which is a main equipment, can be repaired or replaced by reporting to the superior, such as Kim80, in advance.

However, although Song 00 replaced the RTU as stated in the above paragraph (1)(6), the Defendant was entirely unaware of it.

Accordingly, on September 22, 2009, the TRU newly replaced as above sent the 230's water level information to the system server on September 5, 2009, and then caused the failure to transmit the TRU's 230's water level information. Although the actual number of the water has continuously increased, the system server continued to record from 22:53 on the same day to 230's water level according to the information that was received before the close processing of the water level information and the immediately preceding year. On June 03:00 on the following day, even if the water level of the TRU reached 3 meters, each warning station did not display or display the warning broadcasting. It did not operate the warning, etc. installed in the disaster situation room in the Dongcheon-gun National Disaster Agency.

(5) The Defendant, like the above A. (4), was aware of the fact that: (a) if the instant system problems arise by changing a text message to an addressee; (b) the Defendant was aware of the fact that it was 00 persons who could take action upon being aware of the problems; and (c) in such a case, the Defendant designated sights to act on behalf of an addressee in the absence of Song 00; and (d) provided that other persons than Song 00 may check the instant system and take measures at night.

However, the Defendant, without any comparison, started from 00 on September 5, 2009 to 15:0 on 00, and started from Gyeongnam-do for the purpose of the literature of the members of the Eastern Office, and did not confirm whether the system was abnormal in the instant system to 00, and neglected to leave the cell phone connected to the instant system to take any measure at the time of the instant system.

C. The Defendants’ negligence results

On September 6, 2009, North Korea released the Yellow River without permission on the same day on the same day: 03:00 on the same day (by the day: 06 : 10 on the same day, the 69 meters high from the highest level of 06: 4:69 meters). However, the system of this case was not normally operated due to the above occupational work as set forth in the above 00, 01, and 02, which led to co-defendant 1's negligence on the part of co-defendant 1 and 02 on the part of co-defendant 1, thereby making no warning broadcast.

Accordingly, 05: 20 to 05 on the same day: At around 40, the victim 9 (year 41), 098 (year 39), 97 (year 40), 96 (year 39), 95 (year 12), and 07 on the same day, who had been engaged in fishing under the Non-U.S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S

(a) Basic facts

According to the records, the following facts are recognized.

(1) The Korea Water Resources Corporation established a "Gunnam Dam" at the south-Gun of Gyeonggi-do from around October 2006 in order to prevent the inundation of the Jak River due to the discharge of the Yellow River from Hocheon-do or North Korea. On April 25, 2008, the "Convention on the Operation of the Automatic Plow-gun and Mancheon-gun Facilities and Substitute Facilities" was entered into with the "Convention on the Operation of the Automatic Plow-gun and Warning Facilities" around June 2008.

( 2 ) 한국수자원공사는 군남댐 완공 전까지 임진강 수위의 급상승으로 발생할 수 있는 피해에 대비하기 위해 이 사건 시스템을 설치하기로 하고 , 한 & ^ # ( * 개발 주식회사 에게 설치공사를 도급주었다 . 한 & ^ # ( * 개발은 이 사건 시스템의 제어프로그램의 제작 및 RTU 설치를 제 * % # $ 신 주식회사에게 하도급주었고 , 제 * % # $ 신은 RTU 제작 및 설 치를 % $ ^ # 에 재하도급주었다 . 이 사건 시스템은 2008 . 12 . 경 . 준공되어 현재까지 운영 되고 있다 .

(3) Operational system of the instant system

(A) The instant system consists of ① 'water level station' to measure and transmit the level of sloping in the Bridge of Gyeonggi-do, the border point of which is the border area with North Korea, ② 'A through which a system server is installed in the communications room in the office of the Ginjin-Gun Construction Team in the Ginjin-gun, the Gyeonggi-do, the Gyeonggi-do, the Gyeonggi-do, the Gyeonggi-do, the border area with North Korea, ③ 'Takdo, the Haak-do, the Haak-do, the Haak-do, the Hancheon-gu, the lower level of human life and property damage caused by the water level increase, and the warning station established in four places in the Jinjin-do, the Goak-do, the North Korean-do, the Maak-do, and the shortest automation is completely automated (Provided, That if necessary, the manager may directly control and issue a warning by accessing the integrated warning system by directly accessing the Internet).

(B) The main means of communication between water level countries, control countries, and warning countries are wireless communications via satellites, and when satellite communications is not possible, the CDA network, a preliminary means, is used.

(C) In the water-level countries, each of the radar-type deceptive schemes and video-type flooding schemes managed by the Han River Flood Control Center has measured the level of water, and the RTUI has transmitted measured water level information to the server of the controlled country on a one-minute basis.

(D) The server established in the control station shall send a text message stating that ① air warning is to be sent to the respective warning station where the level of the running point reaches three meters, ② air warning is to be sent to five meters and seven meters, ② air warning is to be sent to each warning station, ② air warning is to be sent to the prior designated person 2), and the current level of air warning is to be operated in the disaster situation room of the Macheon-gun Office. ② Air level is to be sent to each designated person 2.5 meters, 4.5 meters, and 6.5 meters of water level is to be sent to the Korea Water Resources Corporation and the annual military personnel in charge of the Macheon-gun Office, and to meet the current level of the warning. ③ The air level is to be sent to each designated person 1.5 meters or less, as the air level is to be sent to each designated person 2.5 meters or less, respectively.

(e) Each warning station has four ample-, ample-, and twelve ampers, and, upon receipt of an order from the control station, show a warning broadcast as determined in advance.

(4) An automatic warning shall be given in the event of the malfunction of the instant system.

(A) If the water level transmitted by a water level country rise above 40 cm between 1 minute and 40 cm between 40 cms, it is practically impossible to change the water level to that level. Thus, the system of this case is cut off by measuring errors and text messages 5) (hereinafter “the text messages 5”) is sent to a person designated as an operator.

(B) The instant system sent an order to check the communications status between the controlled country and the warning country, i.e., sending text messages (hereinafter referred to as “not less than a communication message”) to each warning country through the CDA network. If the warning country does not respond to the fact that the warning country was conducting the broadcast, it sent text messages (hereinafter referred to as “the message”) to the person designated as the operator’s class.

(C) However, in the event of a failure in the RTU in the water-level country, the function of informing the operator of the failure is not in place in the instant system.

(5) Failure to send warning broadcasts and text messages due to the suspension of transmission by the RTU

On September 22, 2009, the RTU of the instant system interrupted the transmission of information on the level of 233's Radar measurement level, 230's 230's Radar, and continued on June 11: 53, 2009 after the accident occurred, the RTU of the instant system continued to run up to September 11, 2009, where the RTU was recorded. Accordingly, even if the water level rises on September 6, 200: 00, such as the radar 00 meters of the radar, the radar and text messages did not recognize the radar radar radic radar radar radar radar radar rad, and thus, the radar radar radar radar rads were not sent.

B. The premise for the determination

The original unmanned monitoring system is more vulnerable to malfunctions caused by devices, malfunctions, etc. than the incentive monitoring system. It is more so true if it is operated in outdoor, such as the instant system, and is affected by the natural environment.

Nevertheless, the Korea Water Resources Corporation decided to operate the instant system for the first time to reduce costs (Evidence No. 22-1) and caused large and small problems in the initial stage (Evidence No. 1134 to 1137, 1531, 1561, 2382, 2586, 2967, 3638, 371, 3711). The problem is that the efforts of the Defendants belonging to a relatively lower class in the Korea Water Resources Corporation could not be resolved immediately with the participation of external experts such as the contractor, etc.

As can be seen, the instant system has not been stable until the time of the accident, but has the essential limitations of the unmanned monitoring system, and most of all, it was omitted from the time of designing the function of automatically warning the breakdown of the TRU, which is a core equipment, and there was no management supervisor in the outside of the Defendant, and there was no management supervisor in the outside of the 00). If the risk was realized at all times in the instant system and the risk was lost in the issuance of the automatic warning was lost, and the Defendants are held liable for criminal liability, then the Defendants shall be held responsible for the principal decision-making authority related to the installation and operation of the instant item.

If so, it is necessary to judge whether the risk was newly caused to the system of this case, which was not previously previously committed by the Defendants, and whether it was connected with the risk or not to recognize criminal liability.

C. Determination on Defendant 00

(1) Replacement, etc. of the RTU (a summary of the facts charged; 6)

(A) It is recognized that the Defendant changed the RTU without the permission of a superior as in the facts charged, and carried out the simplification of lines. However, in order to recognize the causal relationship, it is necessary to prove that the replacement of the RTU and the simplification of lines were the cause of the suspension of transmission of water level information.

기록에 의하면 , 교체된 RTU는 1 . 5버전으로 이전에 설치된 1 . 2버전보다 기능이 향상된 것이고 , 비록 설치 당시에는 국가기관의 인증을 받지 않았으나 이 사건 사고 후 인증을 받았으며 , 2009 . 8 . 경 한탄강 홍수예보시스템에 7대가 설치된 것을 비롯하여 여러 곳에 30여대가 납품되었는데 낙뢰 등 외부적 원인 외의 문제로 작동불능된 일은 없었고9 ) , 소프트웨어적인 문제로 작동을 멈추었을 경우 자동으로 재부팅시키는 기능이 탑재되어 있다 ( 이77 , 김78 , 김76의 수사기관 및 이 법정에서의 진술 ) . 또한 , 교체된 RTU가 작동을 멈춘 원인을 국립과학수사연구소도 밝혀내지 못했고 ( 증거목록 65번 ) , 기 기를 리셋한 것만으로 다시 정상작동하기 시작했다 . 이러한 사정에 비추어 RTU가 자 체 결함이 아닌 외부의 전기적 충격 등으로 인해 작동을 멈췄을 가능성을 배제할 수 없고 , 최소한 교체 전 RTU에는 없었던 특유한 작동불능의 원인이 있었음을 합리적 의 심의 여지없이 인정하기는 어렵다 .

Meanwhile, while Kim 78’s replacing work of the RTU, there is a fact that the 24 V voltage exceeding 13 V, which misleads the cable links with the exhaustter, was displayed at the display window of the RTU. However, it is not clear whether the TRU actually caused the 24 V voltage to the RTU (Evidence 5001 pages of evidence records), and the TRTU operated normally even normally (Evidence 2147 pages of evidence records), and it is insufficient to recognize that the error in the above work was the cause of the impossibility of operation. There is no evidence to prove that the TRU was the cause of the RTU impossibility of operation.

Therefore, there is no causal relationship between the act and consequence stated in this part of the facts charged.

(B) Furthermore, we examine whether the Defendant committed an act of violating the duty of care that neglects inspection and monitoring after the replacement of the RTU.

According to the records, the Korea Water Resources Corporation must conduct daily inspections, etc. on the instant system pursuant to the Regulations on the Operation of Information and Communications Facilities of the Korea Water Resources Corporation (Evidence No. 1663 pages), and accordingly, conducted a flood alarm equipment operation plan for the military red-water control area (0:00, 14:00) once a day in two times every day, and conducted regular inspections, etc. (Evidence No. 4625 pages of evidence record), however, there is no evidence to prove that there was an intention or work instruction to impose the duty of inspection after a holiday or retirement.

On the other hand, the time when the RTU ceased to transmit information was around September 22, 2009 at night, the end of night, around 5:53, 2009, and it was possible to have known that there was a serious problem in the function of the RTU, which should have been connected to the integrated warning system after a considerable amount of time from the above point of view (the defendant had installed a program capable of remote connection to his own ec.g., an integrated warning unit without permission; however, according to the internal rules of the Korea Water Service, for the external connection of the computer network according to the rules and regulations, it is sufficient that the head of the department would obtain the consent for the external connection of the computer network (Evidence 2217 pages of evidence), and that the office of the GTU would work at the GTU’s office in order to connect the integrated warning system pursuant to the provisions. Prior to that, there was no possibility that the RTU would incur serious trouble such as this case, and there was no possibility that there was a new experience problem before the change of experience.

Rather, the Defendant asserts that even around September 5, 2009: 15:00, the Defendant checked that the water level information is being transmitted normally by accessing the integrated alarm system at home. According to the materials submitted by the defense counsel (Evidence 5), the time is unknown, but the Defendant’s access to the integrated alarm system on the above day is confirmed, and the facts charged are confirmed in the judgment on the paragraph (6). As seen in the above point, the Defendant’s assertion is acknowledged as a fact in light of the fact that the Defendant contacted this 81 due to an abnormal communication with the alarm station immediately after the above time, as seen in the judgment on the paragraph (6). Accordingly, the Defendant was able to perform his/her duty to maintain and manage the instant system.

Therefore, it is not determined that the Defendant breached the duty of care to check and monitor the RTU (in order to take measures such as checking and repairing the RTU, it must be done directly by a water level station.) However, in order for the Defendant to enter the military unit under its jurisdiction to be located outside three kilometers from the Military Demarcation Line, it is required to obtain prior approval for entering the military unit. In particular, entry is strictly restricted at night (the defense counsel’s response data on the request for one’s seat on May 30, 201). Therefore, even if the Defendant was aware of the breakdown of the RTU while monitoring the Defendant, it seems practically impossible to operate the RTU until the instant accident occurred).

(2) Modification of the water level information value recorded at the time of determination (a summary of the facts charged; 1)

It is also examined whether the Defendant’s modification of the program would result in the failure of the RTU, which is the cause of the change of the program, to identify whether the function of sending the message above the water level has been lost when the lack of the water level information occurs in the instant system.

In order to recognize this part of the facts charged, it should be proven that the item server is aware of the fact that, in the event of recording at zero or one -1 the water level level level level is compared to the normal level value immediately before or after the recording, and that it causes a sudden change in the water level. In this regard, the Defendant and the defense counsel compared to the above facts charged, and the Defendant and the defense counsel sent a text message above the water level when the server falsely measured the water level level level level level was compared to the previous normal level when the server was found to receive the unlawfully measured water level level, and then sending the text message above the water level. In the case of the compromise, the server did not have any information value compared with the information value that the server was unable to receive the transmission of the above facts charged (the Defendant stated in the investigation agency that it was consistent with the premise of the above facts charged, but it appears that the Defendant did not clearly distinguish the concept of his own side and the lower court at that time.

First of all, the specifications of the instant system are as follows: “When the 40 centimeters wide-level inflation exceeds the permissible rate of 10 centimeters; “The content, i.e., the e., the e., the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e. the e.

Next, this 81, which has prepared a warning control program, has made a statement consistent with this part of the facts charged at an investigative agency (Evidence List 89, 90) but in this court, "Once there is a determination, we can compare it with the file, only if the date is changed, and determine whether to send SPs, and . "..... is not sent data from RUT, - 1' or 0' if the file is not changed, so that the part is cut off and opened without changing the time and date of the trial," and "..........., we should not only make a witness's statement to the investigative agency when it has been finished, but also make a witness's statement to the same effect as the date of the trial...................., we should not only make an entry of SPs' statement to the investigation agency, but also make an entry of SPs' statement to the investigation agency.

Finally, at the time of entering the instant system as “ - 1”, the instant system occurred on January 8, 2009 (Evidence Nos. 3952 through 3953), but the message above the level was not sent (Evidence No. 12-1, 2, 24-1, 24-1, 24-2). Moreover, according to the data submitted by the counsel (Evidence No. 12-1, 3639), the fact that the text message was sent only once again between 53 through 08 and 14).

In light of the above circumstances, there is room for reasonable deliberation as to whether the transmission function of messages above the water level was lost due to the Defendant’s program revision. Therefore, it is not recognized that the Defendant violated the duty of care.

(3) Voluntary change in the water level inflation for which a high-level message is sent (a summary of the facts charged; b)

As indicated in the facts charged, it is recognized that the Defendant arbitrarily changed the water level rise setting that sends text messages informing the water level level level or higher. However, since the direct cause of this recommendation was not issued due to the suspension of the transmission of the RTU’s water level information, the Defendant did not change the water level rise setting, even if the RTU was not changed, no warning was issued.

Therefore, there is no causal relationship between the defendant's act and the result stated in this part of the facts charged.

(4) Preparation of a false report (a) a summary of the facts charged;

First, we examine whether the Defendant’s report prepared on August 19, 2009 is false or not. The following circumstances can be revealed according to the above report (Evidence List 75). In other words, the object of on-site inspection conducted from August 1, 2009 to August 18, 2009 is “the server and the warning station,” and the method of inspection is “the compression of the cause of trouble through comparison of the implementation of on-site alarm broadcasting, monitoring and analysis of on-site alarm facilities,” which is a problem in the facts charged, and the part that “the continuous monitoring of on-site alarm systems is required, but the continuous system monitoring is not required,” which is the part that the Defendant’s report prepared on-site alarm report from 00 to 3,000 to 19:0 on-site alarm report, which is the first day of the 20th day prior to the completion of on-site alarm report, and thus, it is still difficult to say that the above content of on-site alarm report is not prepared.

Furthermore, it appears earlier that matters related to communication between the water level state and the control state were not subject to the report, and as the facts charged are premised on the facts charged, it does not seem that the Korea Water Resources Corporation would have prepared measures to prepare for the suspension of transmission of water level information before the instant accident without the said report. Accordingly, the causal link with the instant outcome is not acknowledged.

(5) A summary of the facts charged for verifying the unsatisfying condition after connection by the warning control-marm

According to the records: (1) around August 26, 2009, the Defendant sent the CD 15 installed in the control station of the instant system; (3) on September 4, 2009, the Defendant re-established the CD 13:0; (2) on the alarm system of the control station and the alarm station to communicate with the CD network, the telephone number of the alarm 2 shall be registered in the alarm system of the control station and the alarm station; (3) on the one channel used for the transmission to the control station among 1 through 5 channels, the Defendant committed an erroneous act of transmitting the CD 14 of each country; (4) on the one hand, the Defendant’s phone number of the alarm 20 times used for the control station; and (5) on the other hand, the Defendant committed an unlawful act of using the monitor 18,000,000,000

However, the satellite communications between the control station and the warning station was normal (Evidence No. 2392 to 2393 of the evidence record), and the CDA communications also was able to send an order to the warning station to the control station. Therefore, if the RTU’s normal transmission of water level information due to its malfunction or failure, it would have been conducted without any causation (Evidence No. 2161 of the evidence record). Accordingly, there is no causation between the Defendant’s act and the result stated in this part of the facts charged.

(6) A summary of the facts charged after the receipt of any communication or more message

At the date specified below, the fact that the defendant received a message containing a mobile phone is determined (Evidence Records 751, 2391, 2392).

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

It is shown on the screen that the communication condition of each warning country and the time for final acquisition of the water level and water level information are the same (Evidence No. 2004 pages). The time when the Defendant received the message listed in No. 18 above table was time when the RTU discontinueds the operation and approximately one hour and about 40 minutes thereafter, so there is sufficient probability that the water level information transmission problem would have been found if the integrated warning system had been accessed immediately thereafter.

그러나 기록에 의하면 , ① 통제국과 경보국간 통신이상은 이 사건 시스템에서 상시 발생하던 문제로 , 한국수자원공사가 2009 . 7 . 1 . , 7 . 15 . 한 & ^ # ( * 개발에 요청한 하 자보수 대상에도 포함된 바 있고 ( 증거기록 1531쪽 ) , ② 이전부터 위성통신 무응답 현상 은 매우 잦았고16 ) , 단풍 경보국의 무응답 비율은 특히 높았으며 ( 증거기록 2930 내지 2948쪽 , 2382 내지 2392쪽 ) , ③ 피고인은 경보국의 위성통신카드 불량이 그 원인인 것 으로 밝혀내고 정01 , 김80에게 보고도 했으나 , 한 & ^ # ( * 개발의 사정으로 인해 위성통신 장비 교체가 지체되고 있었으며 ( 증거기록 2926쪽 , 4475쪽 ) , ④ 앞서 보았듯이 이81이 피고인으로부터 요청받은 경보제어용 모뎀 전화번호의 서버 등록을 지체하는 동안 CDMA 통신이 불통되었고 , 그로 인해 계속 통신이상 문자메시지가 발송되었으며 ( 증거 기록 1647쪽 , 1771쪽 , 2390 내지 2392쪽 ) , ⑤ 이에 피고인은 9 . 5 . 15 : 00경 통합경보시 스템에 접속하여 문제를 확인한 후 이81에게 연락해 전화번호 등록을 재차 요청했고 , 이에 이81은 야간에 등록작업을 하겠다고 약속하고 같은 날 22 : 00경에 이르러 등록을 마쳤으나 작업을 마쳤음을 피고인에게 알리지는 않았다 ( 증거기록 1771쪽 , 4476쪽 ) .

In full view of the above circumstances, the original function of sending text messages was prepared to make it possible for the Defendant to know whether or not the function of sending text messages is no longer connected to the gold system, and the reason was known by the Defendant, and the problem was not that of the Defendant to be resolved promptly. Furthermore, the problem at the time of communication was about the answer to the control of the warning station, and the transmission to the warning station by the control station was normal, so there was no problem in the function of the warning station itself. Thus, it is difficult to recognize that the Defendant has the duty to take measures, such as accessing the respective integrated warning system, whenever he receives the message of communication or the message.

Therefore, it cannot be said that the Defendant violated the duty of care by providing that he did not connect to the item or report to the superior even after receiving more than 38 messages on September 6, 2009 at around 00:38.

(7) A summary of the charge of leaving the cell phone alone (8)

Although the Defendant continued to receive messages containing a mobile phone but did not hand over his duties to others on September 17, 2009: around 00, the Defendant started from around 5:30 on the following day, and returned to 5:30 on the same day. At the time when it cannot be seen, the Defendant’s distribution of the mobile phone falls short of the Defendant’s cell phone and recognized the fact of withdrawal.

However, prior to the fact that the Defendant’s failure to take a measure despite receiving the above message does not constitute a violation of the State’s duty of care. Furthermore, even if the RTU’s failure or suspension of transmission of water level information could not receive the above level message, it would result in the Defendant’s program modification as premised on the summary of the charges. As such, there is no room for dispute over the system limitation like the Defendant’s assertion, and there was no other way for the Defendant or the transferee to know the breakdown of the RTU.

If so, even if the Defendant did not have any local area, or transferred his business to another person while carrying out his mobile phone, it does not seem to be able to take measures, or issue a warning, to the effect that the transmission of the water level information from the instant system was suspended in a timely manner. Accordingly, there is no causal link between the Defendant’s act and the result indicated in this part of the facts charged.

(8) Change of the addressee of text messages (a) a summary of the facts charged

As seen earlier, the instant system was set up to require a person designated as an operator’s class to send a text message related to system errors. It is recognized that the Defendant was unable to receive a text message that has been assigned as an operator’s class between August 19, 2009 and August 23, 2009 (Evidence 1639 pages, 2968 pages, 4458 pages, 458 of evidence records) by converting the instant system’s class into the general class in his mind (Evidence 1639 pages, 2968 pages, and 4458 pages).

However, the record reveals that ① there is no internal determination as to who is the operator’s class of the instant system (Evidence No. 4528, 4744 of the evidence record), ② the remainder remaining after deducting fixed 01 (Evidence No. 3852 of the employees of the National Water Resources Corporation that the Defendant changed to the general class (Evidence No. 3852 of the evidence record) has the ID of the integrated alarm system, or the head of the office is not certain who is responsible for the business to take any measure when the instant system is abnormal), ③ the fixed 01 was aware of the fact that it is difficult to resolve the causes and problems of the communication and its problems within a short time (Evidence No. 3844, 3848, 3849 of the evidence record), and it is difficult to view that the Defendant, a working person, had access to the integrated alarm system each time he receives communications or more.

Therefore, it is not recognized that the Defendant could not receive any message from other employees, including regular 01, does not constitute a breach of duty of care, or even if he/she received a message above the communications, he/she could not be deemed to have accessed the integrated warning system to inquire about the suspension of transmission of water level information and taken measures. Therefore, there is no causal link with the outcome.

(9) Sub-determinations

As such, all acts of the defendant on the facts charged do not violate the duty of care, nor the causal relationship with the result is not recognized.

D. Determination as to Defendant 101

(1) allow the modification of the water level value recorded at the end of the determination, false reports, or neglect of the change of the addressee of text messages;

Failure to supervise the RTU replacement process, failure to perform the duties of Song 00 among local questions (the necessity of the facts charged)

(b) Part of (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5).

The facts charged in this part are that co-defendant's act of Song 00 was negligent in the course of business and there was a causal relationship with the deceased of this case, and the defendant did not properly supervise the defendant's act and neglected or encourage his act. Therefore, the judgment on the act of Song 00 was made by the defendant.

may be applied as it is.

Therefore, each act of the defendant on this part of the facts charged does not constitute a violation of the duty of due care for the same reasons as the transmission0, or the causal relationship is not recognized.

(2) Non-designation of the instant system manager at night and in the absence of 00 hours (a summary of the charges)

(b) (5) Part of (5)

Although the Defendant is a general manager of the system operation and management of this case, he is merely a reporter and a vice-director, who is a part of the Han River Construction Team, and there is no evidence to acknowledge that his authority exceeds the scope of supervising technical level 00, a working person, and also extends to the additional designation of a person in charge of the organization management. Rather, his authority is deemed to exist in this 79 head of the Dajin River Construction Team, a decision-making authority on the division of duties, or in the head of the Han River Construction Team Kim 80 (Evidence Records 979 pages, 1438 pages). Accordingly, it cannot be said that the Defendant violated his duty of care with the Defendant’s failure to designate a business agent of Song River 00.

In addition, even if there was a person who had taken over the transmission of the water level information at the time of the instant accident, the fact that it was difficult to find out the suspension of transmission of the water level information at the time of the instant accident, was already seen in the judgment of 00. Accordingly, the causal relationship is not recognized.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the facts charged against Defendant 00 and 01 do not prove all the facts charged, and thus, they are acquitted by the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

was made.

2) Korea Water Resources Corporation and the Socheon Guns, Gyeonggi-do and Pakistan, fishermen, etc.

3) However, Defendant 00 changed to 500 centimeters between 30 minutes, such as the summary of the facts charged A. (2).

4) However, Defendant 00 changed to 300 centimeters between 1 minute, such as the summary of the facts charged A. (2).

5) “An occurrence, verification, or e.g., the occurrence of a phenomenon of at least the level of fluorine (cinematographic or radars)”

6) Original 4 times a day was conducted, but 34 times a day was increased from July 2009 to grasp the causes of frequent fire.

7) “The result of the control has been processed without response (the name of the responding warning station, control code)”

8) The Korea Water Resources Corporation shall, only after the instant case, have full-time workers working in the control station and establish a warning system, such as additional installation of the RTU.

The operation method was improved.

9) However, although the flood forecast system of the Han River has caused a string phenomenon, this is the server whose water level information is transmitted.

The problem of the mm software is unrelated to the functions of the RTU itself (the legal statement, etc. in this 77).

10) It seems impossible to keep the RTU in a remote manner.

11) In preparation for the decision, it can be referred to as "the wrong side".

12) After re-revision a program so that this 81 is recorded in 00 the time of the decision.

13) In full view of being recorded in “0” both the water level value of video water gauge, the water level value of the radar gauge gauge and the voltage, thereby constituting a transmission of water level information per se.

may be known that it had not been known.

14) In the event that there is a difference between 0'0' or 100' or more of the measurement value of the image and the deception, the water level information has been transmitted.

However, it can be known that the measurement has been conducted by mistake.

15) A preliminary means of communication with a warning station in preparation for satellite communications in distress.

16) 9.1. to 9.4.00 only 114 times.

17) 75, 73, 173, 50, 50, 472, 50,000,000,000,000,000

6) The fact that the Defendant was in charge of the instant system’s operational practice is due to the fact that the Defendant was the only communications worker within the Ginjin Construction Group.

(Evidence Records 4739 pages 4739), 75, Ra72, e.g. machinery, e. 73, and e.g., electricity of the system in this case.

Although there is a duty to perform the system, it is not the person in charge of the original work, and it is also stated that it is well-known about the system of this case.

C. (Evidence Records 175, 176 pages) The System Operation Officer

of this title. It can be known that there is no connection with Ri.