2. The prosecutor’s assertion that the sentencing of the court of the first instance, which sentenced to a relatively minor fine, is unreasonable in light of the following factors: (a) the nature of the crime of obstruction of the performance of official duties; (b) the necessity of strict punishment; and (c) the harm of the punishment against the principal offense.

However, the major circumstances favorable to the defendant, such as the fact that each crime in the judgment was very serious or difficult to recover, the fact that the defendant recognized the crime from the first instance court to expressed his intention of reflect, and that the defendant did not have any criminal power, should also be considered in sentencing.

Furthermore, the circumstances unfavorable to the defendant alleged by the prosecutor are considered both as the grounds for sentencing of the judgment of the first instance, and there is no fundamental change in sentencing conditions compared with the judgment of the first instance.

In addition, taking account of all the circumstances that form the conditions of sentencing as shown in the instant records and pleadings, such as the Defendant’s age, character and conduct, environment, motive and background of the offense, means and consequence of the offense, etc., the sentencing of the court of first instance cannot be deemed to have reached the extent that it is difficult to escape from destruction because the sentencing of the court of first instance is too un

3. Since the appeal by the public prosecutor is without merit, it is dismissed in accordance with Article 364(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. It is so decided as per Disposition.