A. Although the Defendant had talked about the divorce of the victim, the Defendant was divorced with a bad wheels.

There is no talking fact.

B. The sentence of the lower court (an amount of KRW 1.5 million) is too unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. The lower court found the Defendant guilty of the instant facts charged on the ground that the facts charged were proven, based on the evidence of the lower court, comprehensively taking account of the rationality, attitude of testimony, interest in the case, relationship with the parties, etc. of the witness’s testimony by the witness of the lower court.

Examining the judgment of the court below and the court below in comparison with the evidence duly adopted and examined, the judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is an error of law by mistake of facts as alleged by the defendant in the judgment below.

subsection (b) of this section.

Therefore, the defendant's assertion of facts is without merit.

B. The sentencing of a judgment on an unfair assertion of sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, and the discretionary judgment that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing as prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act.

However, considering the unique area of sentencing of sentencing of the first instance that is respected under the principle of trial priority and the principle of direct jurisdiction taken by our criminal litigation law and the nature of the ex post facto review of the appellate court, the sentencing of sentencing of the first instance was exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion when comprehensively taking into account the factors and guidelines for sentencing specified in the first instance sentencing trial process.

In light of the records newly discovered in the course of the appellate court’s sentencing hearing, it is reasonable to file an unfair judgment of the first instance court, only in cases where it is deemed unfair to maintain the sentencing of the first instance court as it is for the court to judge the sentencing of the first instance court.

In the absence of such exceptional circumstances, there is no exception.