횡령등
The judgment of the court below is reversed.
A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for two years.
Summary of Grounds for Appeal
A. As the Defendant delivers a vehicle owned by AC (hereinafter “AC”) with the Defendant’s wife as a representative director to AD, it does not constitute a crime of interference with the exercise of rights under Article 323 of the Criminal Act.
The Defendant had no intention to infringe on the trademark right of P, since he obtained N's permission from P (hereinafter referred to as "P") as an adviser, used P's registered trademark in the main household at the construction site of new apartment construction.
B. The lower court’s sentence of unreasonable sentencing (three years of imprisonment) is too unreasonable.
Judgment on misunderstanding of legal principles and misunderstanding of facts
A. In a case where the representative director of a judgment company as to the obstruction of exercise of rights conceals the company's goods as an act of execution of duties based on the status of representative director, the above act is deemed to be an act as a representative agency of the above company, and thus, the above company's goods should be deemed to be "self
(See Supreme Court Decision 91Do1170 delivered on January 21, 1992). In full view of the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and examined by the court below and the court below, i.e., the owner registered on the above vehicle register at the time when the defendant transferred the above vehicle to AD, i.e., the owner who was the owner of the above vehicle at the time of transfer, ii the representative director of AC was the owner of AC, but the defendant was actually operating AC, iii the defendant was not wholly involved in the business affairs of AC, and the terms and conditions of the loan at the time of purchase of the vehicle were not well-known, it should be deemed that the defendant concealed "self-owned goods" as the representative body of AC, the owner of the above vehicle
Therefore, the defendant's argument that the obstruction of exercise of rights is not established is without merit.
B. The judgment of the court below and the trial court on the violation of the Trademark Act are legitimate.