All A and prosecutor appeals are dismissed.

A. Defendant A: The sentence of the lower court’s unfair sentencing (an amount of KRW 20 million, additional collection of KRW 10 million) is too unreasonable.

B. Prosecutor: (1) The lower court acquitted Defendant C of the facts charged on the following grounds: (a) the statement by the money and valuables donor AA and the statement by AB that provided KRW 100 million in cash to AA; (b) the statement by AD involved in the operation of the L market; (c) the agreement on April 17, 2012 prepared between AB and AA; (d) the agreement on the consultation; (e) the transaction details and share purchase and sale; (b) the Nong account in the name of AM; (b) the Nong account in the name of BK; (c) the transaction details in the name of AL; and (d) the transaction details in the Han Han account in the name of AL.

2) The lower court acquitted Defendant A of the charge of violating the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes) on the purchase and sale of L/C stocks by comprehensively taking account of the statement by the Defendant AA, the statement by the co-offender AB who manipulates the price manipulation, the details of transactions in the KL

2. Judgment on the grounds for appeal

A. As to Defendant A’s wrongful assertion of sentencing, the sentencing is based on statutory penalty, and a discretionary judgment is made within reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on the statutory penalty.

However, considering the unique area of sentencing of sentencing of the first instance that is respected under the principle of trial priority and the principle of direct jurisdiction taken by our criminal litigation law and the nature of the ex post facto review of the appellate court, the sentencing of sentencing of the first instance was exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion when comprehensively taking into account the factors and guidelines for sentencing specified in the first instance sentencing trial process.

In full view of the data newly discovered in the course of the appellate court's sentencing hearing, the first sentencing judgment is maintained as it is.