소유권이전등기
1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
Purport of claim and appeal
The first instance court.
1. This part of the court's reasoning for the acceptance of the judgment of the court of first instance is the same as the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, this part is cited by the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.
2. Parts in height:
A. From the last page 3 to the fourth page 6 of the judgment of the first instance court is as follows:
However, the Plaintiff appears to be a foreign nationality Korean who reported the domestic place of residence. If so, pursuant to Article 11(2) of the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (hereinafter “Overseas Koreans Act”), the Plaintiff will make a real-name registration, etc. only until December 3, 200, within one year after the enforcement of the Overseas Koreans Act.
2. Meanwhile, it is apparent in the record that the Plaintiff’s application for the transfer of ownership registration on the ground of the termination of title trust before the instant lawsuit was filed on April 27, 2015, and it is apparent that the Plaintiff’s application was filed after the lapse of one year from December 3, 1999, which was the enforcement date of the Overseas Koreans Act, which was stipulated under Article 11(2) of the Overseas Koreans Act as the grace period for filing a claim for real name registration on the real estate held in title trust, and thus, the Plaintiff’s claim for the transfer registration was extinguished by the said grace period.
Therefore, the plaintiff's above assertion seeking the implementation of the procedure for ownership transfer registration due to the termination of title trust is not acceptable.
(b) at the end of the fourth decision of the first instance court adding the following judgments:
In short, the Plaintiff’s assertion is premised on the fact that H was transferred to D’s ownership due to any circumstance during the period of six years from February 5, 1920 when H was a state-owned property, and the trust agreement of this case was concluded on March 8, 1926. However, it is difficult to think that D was disposal by selling or lowering the land created by the king and king, even though D was a fluorial relative, it is difficult to think that it was a disposal by selling or lowering the land created by the king and king.