특정범죄가중처벌등에관한법률위반(도주차량)등
The defendant's appeal is dismissed.
1. Summary of grounds for appeal;
A. Fact misunderstanding 1) Violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes) (1) The Defendant went out of the scene of the accident without recognizing the fact of the accident due to driving a stroke, and thus, the Defendant did not have the criminal intent to escape, and 2) cannot be deemed as constituting “injury” under the Criminal Act.
2) Since violation of the Road Traffic Act (unclaimed Measures after Accidents) did not generate non-products from the instant accident, there was no need to take necessary measures in the event of traffic accidents under Article 54(1) of the Road Traffic Act.
B. The sentence of the lower court’s unfair sentencing (the imprisonment of eight months, the suspension of the execution of two years, the order to attend a law enforcement lecture 40 hours, the community service order 160 hours) is too unreasonable.
2. Judgment on the assertion of mistake of facts
A. As to the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Epinsing Vehicles), the term “when the driver of an accident runs away without taking measures as stipulated in Article 54(1) of the Road Traffic Act, such as aiding and abetting the injured person,” refers to the case where the driver of an accident runs away from the scene before he/she performs his/her duty as stipulated in Article 54(1) of the Road Traffic Act, such as aiding and abetting the injured person despite his/her awareness of the fact that the injured person was killed or injured, resulting in an unabstinence of who caused the accident.
In this context, the degree of perception of the fact that the injured person was killed due to an accident is not necessarily required to be confirmed, and even if dolusent, it is sufficient to recognize that the injured person was aware of the fact, and in case of leaving from the accident site, there is a dolusent perception if he was aware of the fact that the injured person was aware of the fact that he was killed
A person may be appointed (see Supreme Court Decisions 2010Do13091, Apr. 28, 201; 201Do14018, Jan. 12, 2012).