2. In a case where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the judgment of the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect them. Although the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the judgment of the first instance court on the sole ground that it is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court, and to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ

(Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). In accordance with the foregoing legal doctrine, no new sentencing data that is unfavorable to the Defendant was submitted in the trial, and there was no change in the sentencing conditions compared with the lower court. Rather, in full view of the fact that the Defendant agreed to the extent of interference with business with the victim during the trial, and all of the reasons for sentencing as stated by the lower court, the lower court’s sentencing is too unfluent and thus, is deemed to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

The prosecutor's assertion is without merit.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the ground that it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.