However, the execution of the above punishment shall be suspended for two years from the date this judgment became final and conclusive.

On September 2019, the Defendant accepted the proposal that “When the credit rating is paid in the way that she deposits money into a new account, she would pay the money to us.” The Defendant accepted the proposal from her staff member in the name scaming, who misrepresented B bank’s agent by telephone, the Defendant sent the money to us by withdrawing the money.”

Meanwhile, on the other hand, on September 25, 2019, an employee in the name of the defendant was transferred KRW 22 million from the victim to a bank account (E) in the name of the defendant on September 27, 2019 to the effect that he falsely assumes a person in charge of lending B bank by phone calls to the victim C, and that he deposits money to the account that is known to the public on condition of repaying existing loans.

The Defendant is in distinction from a general account opening method required by the aforementioned member of the Bosing Organization. The Defendant is asked questions as to whether the method of opening a Masing passbook was connected to Bosing during cash withdrawal, and the Defendant is informed of the financial fraud prevention check under the title “Sing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing Masing 20,000 won out of the funds received from the employees of the Bank in the process of cash withdrawal, and the Defendant was given notice from the above Masing 20,000,000 won to the above Masing 10,000,000 won to the Mas 2.

This is the defendant.