The portion exceeding KRW 58,64,460 among the disposition of imposition of capital gains tax of KRW 132,882,590, and Plaintiff NewB

50,226,840 won in the disposition of imposition of capital gains tax for the year 2013

Each excess part shall be revoked.

The reasoning for this Court’s explanation is as follows: (a) the reasoning for the judgment of the court of first instance modifies the following among the reasons for the judgment of the court of first instance; and (b) the reasoning for the judgment of the court of first instance is the same as that for the judgment of the court of first instance, except for adding the judgment as set forth in paragraph (2) below with regard to the matters alleged by the plaintiff at the court of first instance; and (c) thereby, the same shall be cited in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the text of Article 4

○ The last ten pages of the decision of the first instance court shall be deleted, and the following parts shall be added: “The land which is not used for the business due to justifiable reasons, such as changes in urban planning, other than the reasons of subparagraphs 1 through 11, after acquiring the land in question: the period during which the relevant reason occurred; and

A. As to the assertion that the farmland creation cost should be deducted from the necessary expenses

Since the plaintiffs asserted that the expenses paid as the farmland creation cost should be deducted from the necessary expenses, in full view of the entries in the evidence No. 37 and the fact-finding results with respect to theCC Corporation by the court of the trial of the party concerned, the plaintiff Park Jong-A paid each of the farmland creation cost of KRW 4,923,400 on December 16, 2003, and the plaintiff ShinB paid the farmland creation cost of KRW 7,065,800 on March 4, 2004, and the whole purport of the arguments in full, but it can be recognized that it was refunded on December 16, 2013. Thus, it is difficult to view that the plaintiffs paid the above expenses as the farmland creation cost, and therefore, this part of the plaintiffs' assertion is

B. As to the assertion that Article 83-5(1)12 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Income Tax Act applies

The plaintiffs claim that the period of discontinuance of construction work should be excluded from the calculation period of non-business land because the suspension of construction work by the order of restoration to the D market and the non-use of the land in this case falls under the case where the land is not used for a project due to justifiable reasons, such as the alteration of urban planning under Article 83-5 (1) 12 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Income Tax Act. However, as decided by the court below, it is not clear whether the plaintiffs actually performed civil construction work such as site creation work, etc. on the land in this case, and it is difficult to deem that the restoration order of the D market constitutes a ground for suspending the whole construction work because it is against the fume part. The plaintiffs did not raise an objection to the direction of restoration to the D market or take measures such as obtaining the occupancy or use permit. In light of the above, it is difficult to see that the plaintiffs' assertion or evidence alone does not have any inevitable reason for suspending construction work, and it is also difficult to view that the land in this case

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim of this case is dismissed in its entirety due to the lack of reason, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just, and the plaintiffs' appeal is dismissed in its entirety due to the lack of reason, and it is so decided as per Disposition.