The proviso of Article 62(1) of the Criminal Act provides that “Where a sentence of imprisonment without prison labor or any heavier punishment is imposed for a crime committed during a period of three years from the time a judgment sentencing a sentence of imprisonment without prison labor or any heavier punishment becomes final and conclusive or exempted” as grounds

This includes not only cases where a sentence is imposed on a crime committed at the time three years have not passed since the completion of or exemption from the execution of a sentence as declared by a court, but also cases where a sentence is imposed on a crime committed during the period of suspension of execution, where the suspension of execution has already been invalidated or revoked, and where the suspension of execution has not yet expired at the time of the sentence, and where the effect of

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Do6196, Feb. 8, 2007). According to the record, the Defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for one year at the Ulsan District Court on Nov. 28, 2016 as a crime of violation of the Road Traffic Act, and the judgment became final and conclusive on Apr. 1, 2017, and each of the instant crimes was committed during the suspended execution period under the above judgment.

The lower court maintained the first instance judgment that sentenced the Defendant to six months’ imprisonment with prison labor.

In so determining, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the grounds for disqualification from probation under the proviso of Article 62(1) of the Criminal Act.

According to Article 383 subparagraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for not less than ten years is imposed, an appeal may be filed on the ground

Therefore, in this case where the defendant was sentenced to a more minor sentence, the argument that the punishment is too unreasonable is not a legitimate ground for appeal.

The argument that the sentencing date is delayed is not a legitimate ground for appeal under Article 383 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.