2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. On March 14, 2017, the Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with C, stating that the Plaintiff is the Defendant’s agent, with the terms that the Plaintiff would lease the D Building E (hereinafter “instant real estate”) owned by the Defendant at KRW 150,000,000, for a lease deposit to set the lease deposit amount as KRW 150,000 (hereinafter “instant lease agreement”).

B. The Plaintiff remitted KRW 10,000,000 to C’s account, around March 2, 2017, and KRW 138,000,000 each around 14th of the same month, and around that time, occupied and used the instant real estate.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 and 4, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The assertion and judgment

A. The gist of the Plaintiff’s assertion is that the instant lease agreement entered into between the Plaintiff and the Defendant upon delegation of the Defendant’s authority to conclude the instant lease agreement is valid, and even if not, the Defendant bears the responsibility for expressive representation under Articles 125, 126, and 129 of the Civil Act.

Therefore, the Defendant is obligated to return KRW 150,000,000 to the Plaintiff upon the termination of the instant lease agreement.

B. 1) First, examining whether the Defendant entrusted C with the authority to conclude the instant lease agreement, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to acknowledge this, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this. 2) Next, the Defendant indicated that the power of representation should be granted to C at the time of entering into the instant lease agreement.

Examining whether or not the power of representation granted by or (Article 125 of the Civil Act) has expired (Article 129 of the Civil Act), there is no evidence to acknowledge it.

3) Lastly, considering that C’s act of entering into the instant lease agreement constitutes an express representation beyond the authority (Article 126 of the Civil Act as to whether it falls under Article 126 of the Civil Act), the Defendant’s act of entering into the instant lease agreement together with the overall purport of pleading No. 1, i.e., the Defendant’s act of entering into