자동차운전면허취소처분취소
1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
1. Details of disposition;
A. On July 13, 2017, the Plaintiff, holding a Class 1 driver’s license, driven a B car while under the influence of alcohol leveling 0.078% of alcohol level on the front of the front of the Dong-gu Municipal Ordinance of Macheon-si.
B. On August 14, 2017, the Defendant notified the revocation of the Plaintiff’s respective driver’s license on the ground of the above drunk driving.
(hereinafter “instant disposition”). C.
The Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal against the instant disposition, but the claim was dismissed on November 29, 2017.
[Ground of recognition] The fact that there is no dispute, Gap's 1, 2, 4, 5, Eul's 1 to 10, and the purport of the whole pleadings
2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful
A. Comprehensively taking account of the following: (a) the Plaintiff’s alleged blood alcohol concentration is not high; (b) the Plaintiff’s performance of duties such as transporting patients at an oriental medical hospital; (c) the Plaintiff is essential to obtain a vocational driver’s license; (d) the property owned is economically poor to the extent of the entire day; and (e) the Plaintiff’s livelihood is likely to be impeded when the driver’s license is revoked; and (e) the instant disposition is more unfavorable than the public interest to be gained due to the instant disposition; and (e) there is an error of abuse of discretion.
B. According to the proviso of Article 93(1)2 of the Road Traffic Act, when a person who has driven at least twice a drunk driving again falls under the grounds for the suspension of a driver’s license, the commissioner of the competent district police agency shall necessarily revoke the driver’s license. As such, such administrative disposition is a continuous driving without any room for discretion.
However, according to Gap evidence Nos. 2, 26, Eul evidence Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 10, the plaintiff is found to have violated the Road Traffic Act twice by driving under the influence of alcohol 0.052% on January 13, 2003, and driving under the influence of alcohol 0.107% on June 7, 2008. Therefore, the plaintiff is on the ground of this case's drinking under the premise of such power.