2. Under our criminal litigation law, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the direct principle, it is reasonable to respect the determination of sentencing in cases where there exists no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and where the first instance court sentencing does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). It is recognized that the Defendant shows an attitude against the recognition of each of the instant crimes, and that the Defendant has no record of being subject to the same criminal punishment prior to each of the instant crimes.

However, in light of the fact that interference with the performance of official duties is a crime that undermines the function of the State by nullifying the legitimate exercise of public authority, and the circumstances and methods of each of the crimes in this case, it is also recognized that the nature of the crime is not good, and that the defendant has not yet received any tolerance from the victim of the crime that interferes with the performance of official duties.

In full view of the above circumstances and the Defendant’s age, sexual conduct, motive and background of the crime, means and method of the crime, and all the sentencing factors expressed in the instant records and trial process, including the circumstances after the crime was committed, the sentence imposed by the lower court shall not be deemed to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion or to be unfair because it was too excessive.

3. In conclusion, the defendant's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. It is so decided as per Disposition, since the defendant's appeal is without merit.