1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

Where there was an agreement on price determination, etc. under Article 19(1)1 of the former Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (amended by Act No. 11406, Mar. 21, 2012; hereinafter “former Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act”), and an implementation based thereon, the date when the unfair collaborative act is terminated means the date on which the agreement was terminated, not the date on which the agreement was made, but the date on which the implementation pursuant to the agreement was terminated (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Du11275, Mar. 24, 2006, etc.). Such legal principle applies likewise to cases where a bid collusion on the determination of successful bidder, successful bidder, bid price bid price, etc. under Article 19(1)8 of the former Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act and the implementation based thereon was conducted. Whether the act based on the bid collusion has been completed should be determined by comprehensively considering various individual and specific factors, such as the specific scope, mode, and effect of restricting competition in accordance with the agreement.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, ① The Seoul Metropolitan Government Urban Railroad Corporation (hereinafter “instant construction”) agreed to participate in the instant construction project at a bid price higher than that of the instant joint supply and demand company (hereinafter “the instant construction project”) on the following grounds: (a) the MFT (hereinafter “instant bidding”); and (b) the Plaintiff’s member joint supply and demand company (hereinafter “instant joint supply and demand company”) agreed to participate in the instant construction project at the bidding price higher than that of the instant joint supply and demand company (hereinafter “instant negotiation”); and (c) the Plaintiff participated in the instant construction project at the bidding price higher than that of the instant joint supply and demand company (hereinafter “instant negotiation”); and (d) the construction project and the instant joint supply and demand company (hereinafter “instant joint supply and demand company”) agreed to participate in the instant construction project at the bidding price higher than that of the instant joint supply and demand company (hereinafter “instant negotiation”); and (e) the construction project and the instant joint supply and demand company was selected as a successful bidder of the instant case on January 13, 2008.

Based on the above facts, this case’s agreement is deemed to be the end of the collaborative act in light of the legal principles as seen earlier. As to the specific transaction of this case’s bidding, it is reasonable to deem that the collaborative act of this case was terminated on November 11, 2008, since the contents of the agreement were finally realized and the expected competition-restricting effect was finally determined by participating in the bidding of this case.

Although some of the reasoning of the judgment below on this part is insufficient, it is just to determine that the date of completion of the collaborative act in this case was November 11, 2008, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles on the termination of the collaborative act.

The Supreme Court precedents cited as the grounds for final appeal are different from this case and are inappropriate to be invoked in this case.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

This part of the grounds of appeal is a new argument that only comes into the final appeal, and thus, does not constitute a legitimate grounds of appeal. Furthermore, even upon examining the allegations in the grounds of appeal, the main sentence of Article 49(4) of the former Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act provides that “The Fair Trade Commission shall not issue an order to take corrective measures or impose penalty surcharges, etc. against the relevant violation in the event five years have elapsed since the date on which the act of violating this Act was terminated.” Thus, it is apparent in the legal text that the Defendant’s exercise of the authority to order corrective measures or order to impose penalty surcharges, etc. within the above five years, and it cannot be said that the Defendant complied with the statute of limitations

3. Regarding ground of appeal No. 3

Article 49(3) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereinafter “Fair Trade Act”) provides that when the defendant intends to take a corrective order, etc. as a result of investigating the fact of violation of the Act, he/she shall notify the parties in writing thereof. Article 61-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act provides that when the defendant intends to impose a penalty surcharge, he/she shall specify the type of the violation and the amount of the penalty surcharge and notify the payment in writing. Article 15(1) of the Administrative Procedures Act, which applies mutatis mutandis under Article 53-3(1) of the Fair Trade Act with respect to the delivery of the document, shall enter into force upon the delivery of the document, except as otherwise provided for in other Acts and subordinate statutes.

The lower court determined that the instant disposition was unlawful on the ground that, on the premise that the Defendant’s disposition, such as the corrective order, etc., was made upon written notice, and that the written notice would take effect upon the arrival of the recipient of the service, on November 12, 2013, when five years have elapsed since November 11, 2008, the date on which the instant collaborative act was completed, and that the instant disposition became effective on November 12, 2013.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above statutes and the records, the judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles on the method of notification and effective date of the disposition

4. Regarding ground of appeal No. 4

The lower court determined that, barring special circumstances, such as the Plaintiff’s intentional avoidance of the receipt of the instant disposition, the Plaintiff’s motion and assertion by the Defendant cannot be deemed as contrary to the good faith principle or as constituting an abuse of rights.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to the purport of the statute of limitations.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Sang-ok (Presiding Justice)