[존속살해][미간행]
Whether a crime may be deemed to be a crime due to a mental disorder caused by a mental disorder, such as a defect of the same nature as the shock disorder (affirmative with qualification)
Article 10 of the Criminal Act
Supreme Court Decision 2002Do1541 Decided May 24, 2002 (Gong2002Ha, 1598) Supreme Court Decision 2008Do9867 Decided February 26, 2009
Defendant
Defendant
Attorney Gangwon-won
Gwangju High Court Decision 2010No293 decided October 14, 2010
The appeal is dismissed.
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. As to the assertion of mental disorder
The phenomenon of suppressing a crime due to failure to suppress one's impulse is likely to be found even for the normal person. Thus, barring special circumstances, it cannot be deemed that a person who has such character defect requires an act that is not expected to suppress one's impulse and to demand compliance with the law, and as a matter of principle, it is reasonable to deem that the same nature defect as the impulse disorder does not constitute a mental disorder, which is the cause of reduction or exemption of punishment. However, even if the defect is of the same nature as the impulse disorder, if it is very serious and it can be deemed that it is equal to the person who has originally had mental disorder within its original meaning, the crime resulting from such defect shall be deemed a crime due to mental or physical disorder (see Supreme Court Decisions 2002Do1541, May 24, 2002; 2008Do9867, Feb. 26, 2009, etc.).
In light of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted by the first instance court, the lower court was justifiable to have determined that the Defendant did not seem to have lacking the ability to discern things or make decisions at the time of committing the instant crime on the grounds stated in its reasoning. In so doing, it did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine as to mental and physical disorder, in violation of logical and empirical rules, and in failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.
2. As to the assertion of unfair sentencing
Examining various circumstances that are conditions for sentencing, such as the Defendant’s age, character and conduct, environment, family relationship, motive, means and process of committing the crime, and circumstances after committing the crime, it cannot be deemed that the lower court’s maintenance of the first instance judgment that sentenced the Defendant to 20 years imprisonment with prison labor is extremely unfair.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Min Il-young (Presiding Justice)