2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiffs.

The primary claim place: ① Defendant Seosan shall pay to the Plaintiff ○○ Development Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiff Co., Ltd.”) the amount equivalent to 6% per annum from September 1, 2005 to the date of the first instance judgment of this case, and 20% per annum from the following day to the date of the full payment, with respect to each real estate listed in paragraphs 1 to 4 of the attached Table No. 6450, Feb. 24, 2005, which was made under No. 6451, Feb. 24, 2005, with respect to each of the real estate listed in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the attached Table No. 5 of the same Table, to the Daejeon District Court. < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 18768, Sep. 1, 2005; Presidential Decree No. 18705, Sep. 1, 2005>

Preliminary claim: Defendant Republic of Korea shall pay to the Plaintiff Company KRW 2,496,70,658, and KRW 114,210,00 and each of the above amounts, from September 1, 2005 to the date of the pronouncement of the judgment of the first instance of this case, 6% per annum from September 1, 2005 to the date of the issuance of the judgment of the first instance of this case. The next day is 202 per annum 20% per annum.

2. Purport of appeal

제1심 판결을 취소하낟. 위 주위적 청구취지 ② 항 및 위 예비적 청구취지 각 "이 사건 제1심 판결 선고일까지"를 각"이 사건 항소심 판결 선고일까지"로 구하는 것 외에는 위 주위적 청구취지 및 예비적 청구취지 같은 판결.

The reasoning for this Court's explanation is as stated in Paragraph 1 of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, except for the case where "the fifth and fourth directions of the judgment of the court of first instance" is "the opening of a road", and therefore, this Court shall accept it as it is in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Determination on the plaintiffs' claims

(a) The primary claim shall be filed;

(1) The part demanding the cancellation of the ownership transfer registration against the defendant Seosan City

(A) Summary of the assertion

Article 99 of the National Land Planning Act, which provides that ownership of a public facility shall always be reverted to the State, etc., regardless of the type, scope, construction cause, etc. of an urban planning facility project when a private person installs a public facility while implementing the urban planning facility project, is unconstitutional as it violates the excessive prohibition principle, and thus becomes invalid. ② The Seosan City Mayor, at the request of the Director of Daejeon Regional Tax Office, requested the company to construct seven lots of land, including each land indicated in the separate sheet, as a road around the land of this case, and demanded the company to construct a new urban planning facility project at Seosan City and submit a letter of promise of donation of the urban planning facility project from the plaintiff. This was the first demand of the plaintiff to cancel the registration of cancellation of the ownership transfer on each land indicated in the separate sheet, and it should be included in the separate sheet of the land of this case because it is unreasonable that the city planning facility project should be approved on September 29, 2003 as an execution plan of the urban planning facility project, and it should not be included in the purport of the new plan without direct approval of the plan.

(B) Determination

First, with respect to the claim that the transfer registration of ownership under the name of the defendant Seosan City, which was made for free reversion of each land listed in the separate list, is null and void because Article 99 of the National Land Planning and Utilization Act, which violates the principle of excessive prohibition under the Constitution, is justifiable. The legislative purpose of the above provision is to ensure the smooth securing of public facilities essential in the process of urban planning facility project and to create a pleasant residential environment through the efficient maintenance and management of such facilities, and it can be provided for the public interest by more efficiently maintaining and managing the ownership of the public facilities installed by the project undertaker, and such legislative means can be deemed an effective means to achieve the above legislative purpose. The above provision to gratuitously revert public facilities to the minimum extent is a legal provision to ensure the social restriction of property rights and to maintain a reasonable proportional relation between the restriction of fundamental rights to the project undertaker and the achievement of public interest through such restriction of legal interests, and thus, it cannot be deemed to violate the principle of excessive prohibition [see, e.g., Supreme Court Order 200Hun-Ga31, Feb. 231, 2002].

Next, with respect to whether each ownership transfer registration stated in the purport of the claim should be cancelled because the donation of each land in the attached list violates the principle of prohibition of unfair decision-making or is null and void as an unfair legal act, there is no evidence to acknowledge it. Furthermore, in a case where the project undertaker who implements an urban planning facility project under the National Land Planning Act installs public facilities on the land in the project district with the approval of the project plan for the urban planning facility project, the ownership of the land and facilities constituting the relevant public facilities belongs directly to the State or local government at the same time as completion of the project and the project undertaker fails to pay contributions, and thus, the ownership of the land and facilities constituting the relevant public facilities should not be transferred only after the project undertaker fails to pay contributions (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 9Da63589, Jun. 9, 200; 9Da63589, Jun. 9, 200); and there is no reason to acknowledge the purport of the Plaintiff’s alternative plan to newly construct the land at the time of the project site.

(2) The part demanding to pay money to the defendant company of the plaintiff company

(A) The Plaintiff Company sought compensation for damages in relation to the instant exchange agreement against the Defendant Republic of Korea. The instant exchange agreement is based on ① there is a significant imbalance between the Plaintiff Company’s additional expenses or the value of road sites not reflected in appraisal and assessment with respect to the construction of a new office building. At the time of conclusion of the instant exchange agreement, there was a significant imbalance between the Plaintiff Company and the economic division at the time of the conclusion of the instant exchange agreement, and the Plaintiff Company entered into an economic and psychologicalally imminent situation at the time of the conclusion of the instant exchange agreement. However, the Defendant Company entered into the instant exchange agreement with the Plaintiff Company by taking advantage of the imminent state of the Plaintiff Company. As such, it is invalid as an unfair legal act under Article 104 of the Civil Act, or null and void as an anti-social legal act under Article 103 of the Civil Act, and ③ even if it is not a domestic affairs, it is deemed null and void as a third party’s unfair legal act under Article 103 of the Civil Act, and thus, the Defendant Company’s duty of revocation of the said agreement is deemed to have no business operation.

(i) In light of the purport of the entire pleadings as a result of fact-finding with respect to the fact that the exchange agreement in this case constitutes an unfair juristic act or anti-social juristic act as alleged above, there is no evidence to acknowledge it. Rather, in full view of the purport of the whole pleadings as to Gap evidence Nos. 21-1 through 3, Gap evidence No. 32, the first instance court appraisal corporation, and the Korean Appraisal Board, the public appraisal corporation of the first instance court, the public appraisal corporation of the public office building, the public appraisal corporation should submit appraisal data to the appraiser so that it can be evaluated as completed if there is any reconstruction work, such as removal of the constructed part at the request of the tax office. Thus, according to the following facts, the reconstruction cost due to the alteration of the construction of the public office building is reflected in the appraisal value which is the basis for the calculation of the property value of the plaintiff company at the time of the conclusion of the exchange agreement in this case. (ii) The appraisal price for the plaintiff company cannot be acknowledged as an amount of money to be distributed to the plaintiff company without reasonable reasons, and reasonable reasons, and reasonable.

(B) In addition, the Plaintiff Company: (a) newly constructed and transferred the Seosan Tax Office building; (b) the National Tax Service affiliated with the Defendant Republic of Korea transferred state-owned real estate to the Plaintiff Company; and (c) the assessed price was settled later; and (d) the Plaintiff Company is mixed with the real contract; (b) the Defendant Republic of Korea, the contractor, bears all the costs necessary for construction of the building; and (c) the Daejeon Regional Tax Office’s employees of the Daejeon Regional Tax Office made an oral promise to pay road construction costs, etc. upon the modification of the circumstances following the conclusion of the exchange agreement, changed the exchange agreement into an agreement between the parties; and (d) accordingly, the Defendant Republic of Korea has the obligation to pay the Plaintiff the sum of the above authorization costs, salary and management costs, construction costs incurred by modification, road construction costs, road construction costs, and underground waterway facilities, etc. pursuant to the modified exchange agreement.

However, according to the above facts, since the exchange agreement in this case was combined with the contract in substance, it cannot be deemed that the defendant Republic of Korea should bear the building permit costs, road construction costs, etc., and each statement in Gap evidence Nos. 6 through 10 (including each number), and No. 22-2 of the evidence No. 22, it is difficult to acknowledge that there was an amendment to the exchange agreement with the defendant Republic of Korea to bear the costs of building the plaintiff company's road construction costs, etc., and there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise. Furthermore, as seen earlier, it was reflected in the appraised value, which was the basis for calculating the value of the plaintiff company's property at the time of concluding the exchange agreement in this case. The above salary and management expenses should be borne by the plaintiff company in consideration of the nature of the exchange agreement in this case. Thus, the plaintiff company's assertion is without merit

(3) Sub-decisions

Therefore, all of the plaintiffs' primary claims against the defendants are without merit.

B. As to the conjunctive claim

As alleged earlier, the Plaintiffs asserted that the exchange agreement in this case is null and void as an unfair juristic act under Article 103 of the Civil Act or an anti-social juristic act under Article 103 of the Civil Act, or cancelled as a declaration of intent made by coercion under Article 110 of the Civil Act. Therefore, if the measures for gratuitous reversion of the booksan market on each land listed in the separate sheet are lawful and cannot be cancelled as a valid registration for transfer of ownership in the name of the Defendant Seosan City with respect to the land donated, the Defendant’s Republic of Korea is a return of unjust enrichment, and (i) the appraised value of each land listed in paragraphs 1 through 4 of the separate sheet, 72,782,300, 633,302, 240, 62,240, 6278,547, 81, 81, 380,000,000, 2495, 7081, 6065, 6061.

As seen earlier, the instant exchange agreement cannot be deemed an unfair juristic act, or an expression of intent by anti-social juristic act, or coercion (it cannot be deemed that the Republic of Korea is liable for damages). Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ assertion on the instant conjunctive claim against the Defendant Republic of Korea is without merit without examining any further.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' primary claims against the defendant Seosan City and the defendant's primary claims against the defendant and the defendant's primary claims against the defendant's Republic of Korea are dismissed in its entirety without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is justified in its conclusion, and all appeals against the defendants are dismissed in its entirety as it is without merit. It is so decided as